Do I Have a Bridge for You: Fiduciary Duties and Investment Advice by Facciolo, Francis J.
FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015 5:21 PM 
 
101 
DO I HAVE A BRIDGE FOR YOU: FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES AND INVESTMENT ADVICE 
Francis J. Facciolo 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................102 
I. THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER STATE LAW .....105 
II. THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS.............................................................................113 
III. THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER THE 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT ............................................................118 
A. Compensation ............................................................................... 120 
1. Excessive Compensation ........................................................... 120 
2. Performance Fees ...................................................................... 123 
B. Principal Transactions ................................................................. 127 
C. Limitations of Investment Adviser Liability .................................. 130 
1. Statutory Anti-Waiver Provisions and Limitations on 
Indemnification ................................................................................. 131 
2. Hedge Clauses ........................................................................... 133 
D. Restrictions on Assignments ......................................................... 147 
IV. LIMITED SEC RESOURCES HAVE LED TO INADEQUATE 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS .....................148 
A. State Regulation of Smaller Investment Advisers ......................... 153 
B. Private Causes of Action Under the IAA ...................................... 159 
C. Self-Regulatory Organization ....................................................... 161 
D. Increased Funding for the SEC .................................................... 162 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................164 
 
 Professor of Legal Writing and Assistant Director of Securities Arbitration Clinic, St. 
John’s University School of Law.  He teaches and writes in the area of investment 
management.  He thanks Alec Coquin, David Wohlstadter, and Michael Ogoszewski for 
their research help. He would also like to thank William H. Manz, Senior Research 
Librarian at the Rittenberg Law Library of St. John’s University School of Law, for all his 
research help.  An earlier version of Part IV.C.2 appeared in an article co-authored by 
Leland S. Solon, Exculpatory Hedge Clauses in Investment Advisory Contracts:  
Developments Since Heitman Capital, 21 INV. LAWYER 3 (Feb. 2014). 
FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:21 PM 
102 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate about financial advice in the United States has taken a 
wrong turn.  Instead of focusing on particular practices and the potential 
that these practices raise for conflicts of interest between advisers and their 
clients, the debate has focused recently on whether brokers,
1
 advisers to 
municipal and state issuers,
2
 and advisers to employee benefit plans 
regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)
3
 
should be held to a fiduciary duty standard.  A fiduciary standard implies, 
in the words of Justice Cardozo, that “[a] trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”
4
  
The thought is that brokers and ERISA advisers will be more attentive to 
their clients’ needs if such a fiduciary standard applies.  Certainly, this is 
the basis upon which the Department of Labor is currently considering 
rules that apply fiduciary standards to ERISA advisers.
5
 
This Article argues that this reliance on fiduciary duties is misplaced.  
In part, this is because most fiduciary duties that arise with respect to 
financial advice can be modified by an agreement between the fiduciary 
and the beneficiary.  To be sure, there are procedural limits to ensure that a 
beneficiary has both the capacity and the information necessary to enter 
into a particular arrangement.  But fiduciary duties turn out to be just a 
more punctilious version of contract law, with a few exceptions.  This 
general contractual principle applies to both state fiduciary duties and to 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 703 (2010) (describing broker and adviser duties as being 
“fiercely debated”). 
 2.  See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., MSRB Notice 2011-48, MSRB Files Municipal 
Adviser Fiduciary Duty Rule and Interpretive Notice, (Aug. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/Regulatory-Notices/2011/2011-48.aspx 
(detailing the proposed duties of loyalty and care under MSRB rule G-36). 
 3.  Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, News Release: US Labor Department’s 
EBSA to Re-Propose Rule on Definition of a Fiduciary, (Sept. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/2011/11-1382-NAT.html. 
 4.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 5.  See Opportunities for Savings: Removing Obstacles for Small Business: Hearing 
Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Phyllis Borzi, 
Assistant Sec’y, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Labor) (noting that “Our new rule 
[that revises the definition of ‘fiduciary’] will hold advisers responsible so that small 
employers can have confidence in the investment advice they receive and won’t be left 
holding the responsibility for losses that occur when . . . they’ve dutifully followed . . . 
[imprudent] investment advice . . .”). 
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federal fiduciary duties that arise under statutes such as the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (the “IAA”), the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(the “ICA”), and ERISA. 
Relying on fiduciary duties in connection with financial advice is also 
misplaced because, even where these duties exist, they are cabined by 
procedural restrictions that make them, as a practical matter, unavailable to 
beneficiaries.  This is most evident in the IAA.  Under this Act, the 
Supreme Court has held that advisers have a fiduciary duty to their clients, 
but has restricted the reach of this duty by also holding that clients do not 
have a private cause of action unless they qualify under section 215.
6
  This 
has left enforcement of fiduciary duties under the IAA to the Securities 
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and state security regulators.  Although 
the Supreme Court has not spoken about this issue in the context of the 
ICA, lower court case law overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that, 
except under sections 30(h) and 36(b), no private causes of action exist 
under the ICA.
7
 
In theory, the SEC could be a powerful advocate for fiduciary duties.  
In practice, though, the SEC is so resource poor that it has done a 
remarkably poor job in recent years in finding basic fraud among 
investment advisers, much less in enforcing fiduciary duties.
8
  The SEC is 
so resource constrained that it examines the typical investment adviser once 
every eleven years.
9
  The SEC’s failures led Congress, in section 914 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, to direct the SEC to study the structure of investment 
adviser regulation
10
. 
In a political climate where Congress is very unlikely to give the SEC 
significant additional funding,
11
 the debate has become whether a self-
 
 6.  Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17, 19–20 (1979) 
(noting the existence of federal fiduciary standards and holding that the only private cause 
of action is under § 215 to void the investment advisor contract). 
 7.  See, e.g., Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Congress’s explicit provision of a private right of action to enforce. . . [§36(b) of the ICA] 
suggests that omission of an explicit private right to enforce other sections was 
intentional.”). 
       8.    See infra notes 272-83 and accompanying text.  
 9.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS 14, A-4, A-5 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/ 
913studyfinal.pdf (finding that an increase in the number of investment advisers and a 
decrease in OCIE staff dedicated to examining these advisers has resulted in advisers only 
being examined every eleven years) [hereinafter 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers & 
Broker-Dealers]. 
      10.   Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 914(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
 11.  Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC Must Get Smart with Exams, Be More Efficient, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120313/ 
blog07/120319966 (reporting that “as Washington obsesses about the budget deficit . . . the 
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regulatory organization for registered investment advisers should be 
created.
12
  Such an organization would be self-funding and not subject to 
the severe resource restraints of the SEC.  This Article does not examine 
this debate or take a position on what constitutes the proper method of 
resolving the regulatory problems.  Rather, the purpose of this Article is to 
note that there are material problems in relying on the SEC, as currently 
structured, in enforcing investment advisers’ fiduciary duties. 
This Article looks at both state law and federal securities laws to see 
what fiduciary duties mean in the context of financial advice.  In particular, 
it looks closely at New York law and the IAA.  It concludes that, with the 
exception of a few substantive restrictions found in the IAA, which have 
corollaries in the ICA and ERISA, fiduciary principles do not interfere with 
the freedom of beneficiaries and fiduciaries in creating contractual 
arrangements defining the nature of these principles.  Certainly this 
freedom is subject to procedural safeguards that are more stringent than 
those for normal contracts but, once these procedures are followed, and 
assuming that the beneficiary is capable of giving informed consent, the 
advisory contract can have almost any term.
13
 
This Article examines only one part of financial advice—advice with 
respect to securities.  Financial advice covers a range of asset classes that 
are not securities unless the investment in the assets is indirect.  Thus, this 
Article does not discuss investments in such asset classes as real estate, 
commodities, or collectibles.  This Article concludes that the best way to 
approach these conflicts is not to focus on fiduciary duties and disclosure.  
Rather, the more successful approach would be to ban certain conflicts of 
interest.  Further, this conclusion would not be materially changed if 
financial advice about assets other than securities were discussed.  But it is 
important to acknowledge this limitation so as not to expect a broader 
discussion.  In addition, going forward, this Article will use the phrase 
“investment advice” rather than “financial advice.” 
 
agency never gets as much money as it says it needs”). 
 12.  Suzanne Barlyn, COMPLY-FINRA Reignites Efforts to Oversee Investment 
Advisers, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/ 
finra-advisers-comply-idUSL1E8MK60H20121121 (observing that FINRA is advocating a 
self-regulatory organization for investment advisers, while “[i]nvestment advisers are 
vehemently opposed….”). 
 13.  See Seth T. Taube, et al., The Price of Managing Money: The Applicability and 
Scope of Investment Adviser Regulation, N.J. LAWYER MAGAZINE, Dec. 2000, at 40 (“There 
are few substantive restrictions on advisory contracts under the [IAA].”). 
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I. THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER STATE LAW 
The Restatements (Third) of Agency
14
 and Trusts give a great deal of 
contractual flexibility to fiduciaries and beneficiaries in fashioning their 
relationships.  An agent has particular flexibility.  Sections 8.01 to 8.05 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Agency set out the various default legal 
restrictions on the agency relationship.  The touchstone of an agent’s 
fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, meaning that the agent must act for the 
principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the relationship.
15
  An 
agent must not accept material benefits from third parties for actions taken 
related to the agency, nor may the agent act as or on behalf of an adversary 
or prepare to compete with the principal.
16
  Finally, an agent may not use 
property or confidential information for any purpose except for the 
principal’s benefit.
17
 
Section 8.06 allows an agent to obtain its principal’s consent to 
conduct by the agent that would otherwise be a breach of duty under one of 
sections 8.01 to 8.05.
18
  But, the agent is subject to various procedural 
restrictions in obtaining an effective consent from its principal.  The agent 
must have “(i) act[ed] in good faith, (ii) disclose[d] all material facts that 
the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know would reasonably 
affect the principal’s judgment . . . and (iii) otherwise deal[t] fairly with the 
principal.”
19
  The consent also may not extend beyond “either a specific act 
or transaction, or acts or transactions of a specified type that could 
reasonably be expected to occur in the ordinary course of the agency 
relationship.”
20
  Contained within Comment b is the important qualification 
that:  
an agreement that contains general or broad language purporting 
to release an agent in advance from the agent’s general fiduciary 
obligation to the principal is not likely to be enforceable.  This is 
because a broadly sweeping release of an agent’s fiduciary duty 
may not reflect an adequately informed judgment on the part of 
 
 14.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person 
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 15.  Id. §8.01. 
 16.  Id. §§ 8.02–04. 
 17.  Id. § 8.05. 
 18.  See id. §8.06, reporter’s note (a) (explaining that the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency contained similar provisions allowing most duties owed by an agent to a principal to 
be qualified by consent of the principal.). 
 19.  Id. § 8.06(1)(a). 
 20.  Id. § 8.06(1)(b). 
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the principal; if effective, the release would expose the principal 
to the risk that the agent will exploit the agent’s position in ways 
not foreseeable by the principal at the time the principal agreed to 
the release.
21
   
The concept contained in Comment b finds its counterpart in the 
SEC’s position on hedge clauses under the IAA, which are discussed in 
Part V.C.2. of this Article. 
Although trust law contemplates a three-party arrangement with a 
settlor, a trustee, and a beneficiary, unlike the two-party arrangement of an 
investment adviser and advisee, trust law affords a great deal of latitude to 
the parties in crafting their relationship.  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
contains similar provisions with respect to varying the default duties of 
trustees, as does the Restatement (Third) of Agency with respect to agents.  
Although there is language in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts that 
indicates that a settlor may be limited in the extent to which she can waive 
fiduciary duties owed by a trustee,
22
 there is no such limitation on what a 
beneficiary may do in consenting to a “breach of trust,” excepting 
procedural limitations on this consent.  The beneficiary must have “the 
capacity to” consent, must be aware of her “rights and of all material facts 
and implications that the trustee knew or should have known relating to the 
matter,” and must have made the decision free of any “induce[ment] by 
improper conduct of the trustee.”
23
  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
contains a specific section covering exculpatory and no-contest clauses in 
the trust instrument.  Section 96 allows such clauses so long as they were 
not obtained by the trustee “as a result of the trustee’s abuse of a fiduciary 
or confidential relationship” and do not  
purport[] to relieve the trustee (a) of liability for a breach of trust 
committed in bad faith or with indifference to the fiduciary duties 
of the trustee, the terms or purposes of the trust, or the interests of 
the beneficiaries, or (b) of accountability for profits derived from 
 
 21.  Id. § 8.06 cmt. b. 
 22.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (2003) (“It is contrary to 
sound policy, and a contradiction in terms, to permit the settlor to relieve a ‘trustee’ of all 
accountability .”); id. § 77 cmt. d (2003) (“[T]rust terms may not altogether dispense with 
the fundamental requirement that trustees not behave recklessly but act in good faith, with 
some suitable degree of care, and in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the 
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.”); id. § 86 cmt. b (2003) (“A trustee’s duties, like 
trustee powers, may be modified by the terms of the trust, but the duties of trusteeship are 
subject to certain minimum standards that are fundamental to the trust relationship and 
normally essential to it.”); id. § 87 cmt. d (2003) (“It is contrary to sound policy, and a 
contradiction in terms, to permit the settlor to relieve a trustee of all accountability.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 23.  Id. § 97. 
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a breach of trust.
24
 
State case law is in accord with the Restatements.  In New York, for 
example, Ridgely v. Keene held that an investment adviser was in a 
“relation[ship] . . . of confidence and trust” with his clients when “[h]e 
expected them to act upon his advice in the purchase and sale of stock.”
25
  
The investment adviser in Ridgely published “circular letters” that were 
sent to approximately 1,000 subscribers.
26
  The investment adviser agreed 
with a group of stockbrokers that he would tout Southern Pacific shares, 
and, in return, the stockbrokers agreed to make a payment to the adviser.
27
  
Although the investment adviser’s clients purchased over 100,000 shares, 
the stockbrokers evidently refused to honor their side of the agreement to 
pay the investment adviser.
28
  The investment adviser sued the stockbrokers 
and the Appellate Division refused to enforce the contract, holding that it 
was “illegal and contrary to good morals.”
29
 
The investment adviser had represented to its clients that it had no 
connection to any stockbrokers.  The Appellate Division, however, held 
that, “even had there been no express representations made by him, there 
would have been an implied obligation on his part not to receive pay from 
third parties for advising [his clients] in a particular way.”
30
  In addition, 
the court held that the investment adviser’s state of mind was not relevant 
because “his belief in the soundness of his advice is wholly immaterial.”
31
 
The Appellate Division ended with sweeping language that might lead 
one to expect that New York does not allow the beneficiary of a fiduciary 
duty to consent to any variation in its terms: “The law takes into account 
human frailty, and absolutely forbids the assumption of conflicting 
obligations and duties . . . .”
32
  This conclusion, however, is belied by later 
New York case law that makes clear that an informed beneficiary may 
agree to variations in the default fiduciary rules. For example, in Cholot v. 
Strohm, the Appellate Division held that a broker acting for the sellers of 
shares who received compensation from the buyer of the shares did not 
violate section 439 of the Penal Law (now sections 180.00 to 180.05)
33
 
 
 24.  Id. § 96(1). 
 25.  Ridgely v. Keene, 134 A.D. 647, 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909). 
 26.  Id. at 648. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 648. 
 29.  Id. at 650. 
 30.  Id. at 649. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 33.  Commercial bribing in the second degree is “confer[ring], or offer[ing] or 
agree[ing] to confer any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent 
of the latter’s employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his 
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because he “told . . . the owners of the . . . shares . . . what compensation he 
was to receive from” the buyer of the shares.
34
  In the court’s view, the 
sellers “knew that [the buyer] was compensating [the broker] for his 
services.”
35
 
There has been debate among legal academics on the extent to which 
fiduciary law actually functions as contract law or as tort law.  On one side 
stands Professor Tamar Frankel, the most prominent academic in the study 
of investment companies and investment advisers.
36
  She points out, for 
example, that the duties of disclosure under fiduciary law and contract law 
 
employer’s or principal’s affairs.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (McKinney 2010).  
Commercial bribing in the first degree is the same as the second degree, but requires that the 
benefit to the agent “exceed[] one thousand dollars and cause[] economic harm to the 
employer or principal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.”  Id. at § 180.03.  
Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree occurs when a fiduciary “solicits, accepts 
or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding 
that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or principal’s 
affairs.”  Id. at § 180.05.  Commercial bribe receiving in the first degree is the same as the 
second degree, but requires that the “value of the benefit solicited, accepted or agreed to be 
accepted exceeds one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or 
principal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.”  Id. at § 180.08. 
 34.  Cholot v. Strohm, 256 N.Y.S. 647, 653 (App. Div. 1932). 
      35.   Id.; accord United States v. Grace Evangelical Church of S. Providence Ridge, 132 
F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1942); Schiff v. Kirby, 194 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (holding 
similarly).  Although Grace Evangelical Church of South Providence Ridge is not a case 
under New York law, it is particularly interesting as it provides a clear example of why a 
fiduciary should not be allowed to benefit from payments from a third party even if the 
beneficiary agrees to this arrangement.  The U.S. Department of War had hired a Mr. 
Herman to acquire land for various projects such as an ordinance factory.  132 F.2d at 461.  
As part of the option contracts that Mr. Herman presented to landowners, the landowner 
agreed to pay Mr. Herman a 5% commission on the sales price to the U.S. if the U.S. 
exercised its purchase option.  Id.  The majority of the court had no problem in rejecting the 
U.S.’s argument that this contract was against public policy “because it appears therefrom 
that the agent of the Government was to receive a commission from the vendor.”  Id.  As the 
majority pointed out, “[i]t is obvious that the Government was fully aware of this provision; 
that it was fully advised and had apparently approved a system whereby it permitted its 
agent to procure options providing for payment of his commission by the vendors.”  Id.  The 
dissenting judge would have upheld the district court in denying enforcement of the option 
contract on the grounds that it was against public policy.  The dissenting judge opined that:  
“[s]ound reason and common sense, alike, condemn this contract as violative of 
sound public policy.  Instead of protecting the public (the Government and the 
taxpayers), it furnished incentive for raids on the Treasury.  Herman was 
financially benefited by higher, not lower, purchase prices.  Under the 
circumstances, the vendor was, of course, willing to pay a commission to the 
buyer’s representative for both were interested in boosting the price.  But who 
was there to protect the U.S. Government?”   
Id. at 463 (Evans, J., dissenting). 
 36.  See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (Oxford University Press 2007) (providing a 
primer on fiduciary law and its development).  
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are very different.
37
   
A fiduciary must provide an entrustor with relevant information, 
including information about conflicts of interest, even if the 
entrustor does not ask for it.  A fiduciary must account for its 
actions.  Further, it is doubtful whether an entrustor can 
effectively waive the right to truthful information.  A contract 
party need not offer information unless the other party asks for it 
or unless it is required by the contract terms or specific law to do 
so.
38
 
On the other side, commentators such as Professor Langbein,
39
 Judge 
Easterbrook, and Professor Fischel
40
 have made strong arguments that 
fiduciary law functions as a set of default rules that are subject to 
negotiation between the parties.  “[V]irtually all trust law is default law—
rules that the parties can reject.  The rules of trust law apply only when the 
trust instrument does not supply contrary terms.”
41
 
This Article does not take a position on this debate, but makes a more 
limited point.  Fiduciary duties are not inviolable.  Rather, they are subject 
to being negotiated between the fiduciary and the beneficiary.  Certainly, 
the beneficiary receives the benefit of a process that is meant to ensure she 
has full disclosure upon which to base her decisions.  And there may even 
be certain limits to what the beneficiary can agree to, as pointed out by 
Professor Frankel.
42
  But within these parameters, the relationship between 
a fiduciary and a beneficiary may be defined by agreement between the two 
parties. 
The fact that fiduciary duties function as defaults does not mean that 
they are necessarily irrelevant.  It might be the case, for example, that the 
process of getting a beneficiary’s consent to a conflict of interest means 
that some investment advisers never seek consent from their advisees for 
certain conflicts.  An investment adviser might be afraid that its advisees, if 
 
 37.  Id. at 235–36. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625 (1995). 
 40.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 425 (1993). 
 41.  Langbein, supra note 39, at 650.  “Another fundamentally contractarian 
reinforcement for the conventional duties of loyalty and prudence is the rule that the 
beneficiary may consent to trustee behavior that would otherwise breach these duties.”  Id. 
at 660.  For a similar analysis in the context of corporate law, see Henry L. Butler & Larry 
E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
      42.    See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1212 
(1995) (noting that there beneficiaries (or entrustors)  “may only waive fiduciary duties 
owed to them if they follow a two-step procedure.”). 
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asked to consent to a particularly egregious conflict, might leave the 
investment adviser for another investment adviser that does not seek such 
consent.  This is certainly the theory behind many of the federal securities 
laws.  As expressed in the famous words of Louis Brandeis: “Publicity is 
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight 
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”
43
  As Brandeis understood the effects of disclosure, “real” 
disclosure would lead underwriters to stop charging excessive commissions 
on securities offerings, presuming that potential buyers would go on 
“strike” against such commissions.
44
 
This market-based discipline, however, has been challenged by work 
in behavioral economics that, in turn, has been applied to disclosure issues 
by legal academics.  A series of cognitive biases have been identified that 
can influence investors.  One leading article in the area of securities 
regulation has identified the relevant biases as including “the hindsight 
bias, the (flawed) reliance on heuristics (including the availability 
heuristic), the presence of overconfidence and overoptimism, the 
endowment effect (and other framing related biases), and the confirmation 
bias.”
45
  The article goes on to state that “[f]rom a behavioral 
perspective . . . disclosure risks confusing investors already suffering from 
bounded rationality, availability, and hindsight.”
46
 
Beyond the general concerns with effectiveness of disclosure that have 
been identified in the literature on cognitive biases and securities 
regulation, concerns about the effectiveness of disclosure as a remedy for 
conflicts of interest have been raised by one group of researchers.
47
  This 
 
 43.  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
 44.  Id. at 101–02. 
 45.  Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 7–9 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
 46.  Id. at 60.  For a number of reasons, Professors Choi and Pritchard themselves are 
not proponents of applying behavioral insights to securities regulation.  They argue that 
some cognitive biases offset each other and that the regulators who make up the SEC are 
subject to their own cognitive biases.  Id. at 16, 20–36.  They also point out that “[d]espite 
efforts at categorization, no underlying theory behind why we operate under biases has 
emerged.  Instead of a theory, behavioral economics relies on a hodgepodge of evidence 
showing the effectiveness of human decisionmaking in various circumstances (often in a 
controlled, laboratory setting).”  Id. at 10.  In the view of Professors Choi and Pritchard, the 
lack of a theory means that it is impossible to know what regulatory interventions would be 
effective in dealing with cognitive biases in investors.  Id. at 11. 
 47.  Professors Daylian Cain (the School of Management, Yale University), George 
Lowenstein (the Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University), 
Sunita Shah (the Fuqua School of Business), and Don Moore (Tepper School of Business, 
Carnegie Mellon University) have cooperated in a shifting group on a series of experiments 
and papers reporting on these experiments. See Daylian M. Cain et al., When Sunlight Fails 
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research has produced a provocative body of work arguing that not only 
may disclosure of conflicts of interest provide no additional protection to 
beneficiaries, but it may actively encourage both beneficiaries and advisers 
to ignore the conflicts.
48
  In addition, this research has found beneficiaries 
to be incapable of accurately discounting the advice they receive from 
conflicted advisers.
49
 
This research was based on a series of experiments where the 
beneficiaries (called “estimators” in the research) were asked to estimate 
various values of houses for sale, for example, and were advised on 
appropriate estimates.
50
  The researchers created two situations, one in 
which advisers would benefit from high estimates (“conflicted”), and one 
in which advisers would not benefit (“non-conflicted”).
51
  In addition, some 
advisers told their estimators that they were giving conflicted advice, while 
other estimators were not told about the conflict.
52
 
This research was based on the assumption that “whether disclosure 
hurts or helps the advisee depends on the net impact of disclosure on two 
competing effects: (1) bias in the advisor’s suggestion and (2) discounting 
by the advisee.”
53
  Some advisers were motivated by disclosure of their 
conflicts of interest “to exaggerate their advice further; however, others are 
likely to rein in their advice, instead.”
54
  The reason that a conflicted 
adviser would exaggerate is obvious: the adviser benefits from an advisee 
overestimating.  A conflicted adviser would be tempted to exaggerate even 
more if the conflict is disclosed out of concern that the advisee will 
discount conflicted advice.  But another adviser “might attempt to 
counteract the increased mistrust that disclosure brings by reigning in 
advice so that it looks realistic (i.e., so that the advice is not beyond the 
plausible max).”
55
 
The researchers located the tendency of advisers to exaggerate in what 
they termed “moral licensing.”
56
  A series of psychological mechanisms all 
provide cover for providing conflicted advice.  Surprisingly, when there is 
no disclosure of a conflict, advisers will forego “giv[ing] maximally biased 
 
to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interests, 37 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 836, 837 (2011) (discussing prior research). 
     48.    Id. at 849-50. 
     49.    Id. at 850-51. 
     50.    Id. at 842. 
     51.    Id. at 843. 
     52.    Id. 
    53.  Id. at 838. 
 54.  Id. at 841. 
 55.  Id. at 839. 
 56.  Id. at 841. 
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advice,”
57
 in part because of the adviser’s “desire to behave as she thinks 
the receiver expects her to behave.”
58
  But disclosure reduces the moral 
restraint that advisers feel in advising advisees.
59
 
The net effect of this academic work on disclosure under the federal 
securities law, and disclosure of conflicts of interest in particular, is that we 
should be skeptical of the effectiveness of disclosure as a remedy for 
conflicts of interest, especially when we are considering financial advice to 
small investors.  This is the lesson that has been drawn, for example, in 
Australia from its Future of Financial Advice initiative and in the United 
Kingdom from its Retail Distribution Review initiative.
60
  In deciding to 
restrict certain compensation arrangements that compensate investment 
advisers for selling certain products, both countries have focused on the 
conflicts such compensation arrangements can create between the self-
interest of the investment advisers and the best interests of their clients.
61
 
And, in both countries, the regulatory authorities have rejected disclosure 
as the sole or primary remedy.
62
 
In Australia, the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (the 
“ASIC”) has issued a detailed report on financial literacy among investors, 
discussing many of the cognitive biases identified by behavioral 
economics.
63
  In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (the 
“FSA”), which recently has been split into two separate regulatory 
authorities, commissioned a report by several academics that discussed 
behavioral economics in detail.
64
 
The Australian report called for more research in the area, especially 
 
 57.  Id. at 839. 
 58.  Jason Dana, Daylian M. Cain & Robyn M. Dawes, What You Don’t Know Won’t 
Hurt Me: Costly (But Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games, 100 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 193, 195 (2006). 
 59.  Cain, supra note 47, at 840; see also Chen-Bo Zhong, Katie A. Liljenguist & 
Daylian M Cain, Moral Self-Regulation: Licensing and Compensation in Psychological 
Perspectives on Ethical Behavior and Decision-Making, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING (David De Cremer ed., 2009) (asserting that 
advisers are more likely to provide candid advice in the presence of disclosure). 
      60.  See Francis J. Facciolo, The Revolution in Investment Adviser Regulation, 18 
INVESTMENT LAWYER 21 (Oct. 2011) (discussing reforms in Australia and the U.K. with 
regard to changes in the compensation of investment advisers for their advice by retail 
clients) 
     61.    Id. at 24-25, 27-28. 
 62.  Id. at 29. 
 63.  AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N (ASIC), REPORT 230, FINANCIAL LITERACY AND 
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE  99-101 tbl. A1.17 (2011) (Austl.) [hereinafter ASIC Report 230]. 
 64.  DAVID DE MEZA ET AL., FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (FSA), FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: A 
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE (2008) (U.K.), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf. 
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in “‘real’ financial settings.”
65
  But, based on the research done through 
2010, the report concluded that “[w]hile raising people’s level of financial 
knowledge forms the basis of many financial literacy initiatives around the 
world, there is a growing body of research suggesting that knowledge is 
only one factor when considering how to help people make positive 
financial decisions.”
66
 
The de Meza report prepared for the FSA reaches similar conclusions 
to the ASIC report:  
The indirect evidence from behavioural economics is that low 
financial capability is more to do with psychology than with 
knowledge.  Institutional design and regulation are probably far 
more effective than education, though crisis counselling [sic] 
may be helpful.  More research is needed on whether cognitive 
biases can be overcome in the personal finance domain.
67
 
It is long past time for the United States to move beyond either 
fiduciary duties or disclosure when regulating investment advice to 
individual investors.  Fiduciary duties that can be varied by informed 
consent are merely a more demanding form of disclosure.  If disclosure 
itself is not an effective means of protecting individual investors, then 
fiduciary duties will also be ineffective, except in those situations in which 
the investment adviser does not specify what those duties are in the 
agreements with its clients.  In other words, fiduciary duties would function 
as default rules, much as the Uniform Commercial Code provides default 
rules in sales.  But a legally savvy investment adviser would make sure to 
vary these default rules by contract. 
II. THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS 
In Capital Gains Research Bureau, the Supreme Court addressed the 
duties that investment advisers owe their clients in connection with an 
allegation of scalping.
68
  The investment adviser in Capital Gains had 
published a newsletter that recommended particular stocks to 5,000 
subscribers.
69
  Prior to recommending the stocks, the investment adviser 
purchased these stocks and, once its recommendations came out and the 
price of these stocks increased, the investment adviser sold them at a 
 
 65.  ASIC Report 230, supra note 63, at 4. 
 66.  Id. at 32. 
 67.  DE MEZA ET AL., supra note 64, at 4. 
 68.  S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
 69.  Id. at 183. 
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profit.
70
  On the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against these 
practices, the Supreme Court held that this scalping “operate[d] as a 
[section 206(2)] fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”
71
  In 
arriving at this holding, the Court several times made general statements 
concerning the fiduciary duties owed by investment advisers to their 
clients, noting that “[t]he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . reflects a 
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment 
advisory relationship;’”
72
 that “Congress recognized the investment adviser 
to be . . . a fiduciary;”
73
 and that the IAA, “in recognition of the adviser’s 
fiduciary relationship to his clients, requires his advice be disinterested.”
74
 
As Professor Laby has argued persuasively, these statements in 
Capital Gains do not unambiguously support the conclusion that the 
Supreme Court held that Congress created a fiduciary duty under the IAA.
75
  
The Supreme Court may only have been pointing to a pre-existing state law 
duty rather than construing Congress’ intent.  Later courts, however, 
including the Supreme Court itself, have “often cited [Capital Gains] for 
the proposition that the Advisers Act imposed a federal fiduciary duty on 
advisers.”
76
  It is now settled law that the IAA creates fiduciary duties for 
investment advisers.
77
 
Once we examine the IAA and provisions of related federal securities 
acts that apply to investment advisers, two things become clear.  First, these 
acts collectively provide for few substantive restrictions on investment 
advisers that grow out of these fiduciary duties.  Second, even with respect 
to the limited restrictions on investment advisers under the IAA and ICA, 
the courts have not been favorably disposed to private causes of action. 
In the IAA, the only obvious substantive restrictions are on certain 
capital appreciation or capital gain performance fees contained in section 
205(1), on assignments without the approval of the advisee contained in 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 181 (internal quotations omitted). 
 72.  Id. at 191. 
 73.  Id. at 194. 
 74.  Id. at 201. 
 75.  Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051 (2011). 
 76.  Id. at 1053 (internal citation omitted). 
 77.  Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16 (1979) (“As we have 
previously recognized, § 206 establishes ‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct 
of investment advisers.”) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471, n.11 
(1977)).  As Professor Laby details, the trail of Supreme Court precedent leads from the 
general statements in Capital Gains, which do not identify the source of the fiduciary duty, 
through footnote eleven in Santa Fe, which characterizes the holding in Capital Gains, to 
the confident statement of Congress’ intent in Transamerica.  Laby, supra note 75, at 1063–
75. 
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section 205(2), and on principal sales contained in section 206(3).
78
  
Through the administrative process, the SEC has created other substantive 
restrictions, including restrictions on the fees that investment advisers may 
charge,
79
 restrictions on certain brokerage transactions,
80
 and restrictions on 
releases by advisees of investment adviser liability for breaches of 
fiduciary duties.
81
 
The ICA contains certain substantive restrictions on the arrangements 
between investment advisers and registered investment companies.  In 
section 36(b), the ICA also contains the injunction that:  
[t]he investment adviser of a registered investment company shall 
be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of 
compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, 
paid by such registered investment company or by the security 
holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated 
person of such investment adviser.
82
 
Although there has been a fair amount of litigation involving section 
36(b), there is not a single published case in which a plaintiff prevailed on 
such a claim.
83
  The ICA also regulates the contract between an investment 
adviser and a registered investment company as to form (it must be in 
writing), methods of approval by shareholders and the board of directors of 
a registered investment company, assignment by the investment adviser of 
the contract, and content of the contract (to a certain extent).
84
  Finally, the 
ICA’s prohibited transaction provisions in section 17 cover investment 
advisers if they are affiliates of a registered investment company, which 
 
 78.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §§ 205(a)(1)–(2), 206(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-
5(a)(1)–(2), 80b-6(3) (2006). 
 79.  See  infra Part IV.A–C (explaining restrictions on the performance fees). 
 80.  See infra Part IV.A–C (clarifying the implications of the IAA on investment 
advisers acting as brokers). 
 81.  See infra Part IV.A–C (describing the ways the IAA and ICA prevent investment 
advisers from limiting their liability to advisees). 
 82.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006). 
 83.  See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why 
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 117 (2010) 
(noting empirical study of 36(b) cases since 2000 shows no plaintiff’s verdicts); John P. 
Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 86 (2008) (claiming that 36(b) has never yielded a plaintiff’s verdict); 
James R. Carroll & David S. Clancy, ‘Excessive Fee’ Lawsuits, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 2008, 
at 12 (describing how no plaintiff has won a 36(b) verdict going back to the 1990s).  It is 
possible that plaintiffs have found a means of more successfully pursuing section 36(b) 
actions by focusing on investment advisers that regularly use sub-advisers.  See Francis J. 
Facciolo, New Wave of Cases Involving Investment Adviser Fees, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 2013, at 
4, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202622006908/New-Wave-of-
Cases-Involving-Investment-Adviser-Fees?slreturn=20141003154711. 
 84.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (2006). 
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they normally will be by operation of the definition of “affiliate” in section 
2(3)(E).
85
 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in section 28(e), provides a 
safe harbor from fiduciary duty claims to investment advisers who comply 
with its terms.  These claims are those that would arise:  
solely by reason of [a person, such as an investment adviser] 
having caused [an] account to pay a member of an exchange, 
broker, or dealer an amount in excess of the amount of 
commission for effecting a securities transaction in excess of the 
amount of commission another member of an exchange, broker, 
or dealer would have charged for effecting that transaction.
86
   
Such payments are commonly called “soft dollar” transactions 
because the person effecting the transaction is using commissions to pay 
for something other than the execution of a securities transaction, such as 
research, rather than using “hard dollars” to pay for the something else.
87
 
Finally, there are substantive restrictions that are contained in NASD 
Rules 2830 and 2420, which have been carried forward by FINRA.  These 
restrictions constrain the activities of broker-dealers when acting as sales 
agents for registered investment companies.
88
  Without engaging in the 
debate about what standards broker-dealers should be held to when dealing 
with clients, broker-dealers certainly do provide investment advice to many 
clients.  Broker-dealers escape regulation under the IAA if they can meet 
the “solely incidental” test set forth in section 202(a)(11)(C).
89
  But broker-
dealer commissions and certain transactions with investment companies are 
substantively regulated under Rule 2830.
90
 The regulation of commissions 
is indirect, as a broker-dealer cannot sell shares in a registered investment 
company “if the sales charges described in the prospectus [of the 
investment company] are excessive.”
91
  The rule then defines what levels of 
charges “shall be deemed excessive,” with different rules for investment 
 
 85.  Id. §§ 2(3)(E), 17 (defining “affiliated person” of an investment company as “any 
investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof”). 
 86.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2006). 
 87.  See generally D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and 
Economics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1553–54 (2009) (discussing typical soft dollar 
arrangements). 
 88.  FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL, NASD RULES §§ 2420, 2830, 
available at http://finra.complinet.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). 
 89.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) 
(2006) (exempting from the definition of investment adviser any broker or dealer 
performing advisory services solely incidental to its main function and who receives no 
special compensation for the advice). 
     90.    FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2830. 
 91.  FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2830 (emphasis added). 
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companies that charge asset-based sale charges and those that do not.
92
 
In addition, Rule 2830 also regulates certain transactions between 
broker-dealers and registered investment companies that might lead a 
broker-dealer to favor sales of shares in one investment company over 
shares in another investment company.
93
  All of these prohibited 
transactions involve arrangements whereby an investment company would 
use its portfolio transactions to reward a broker-dealer for sales of shares in 
the investment company.  The problem is fairly straightforward:  a broker-
dealer might favor sales of shares in a particular investment company 
because the investment company directs its portfolio business to the 
broker-dealer, thus generating commissions for the broker-dealer.  The 
methods of a broker-dealer’s favoring a particular investment company are 
varied.
94
 
The basis for Rule 2830 is a broker-dealer’s duty of suitability and the 
conflicts of interest that these sales practices raise.
95
  In other words, a 
broker-dealer should not be influenced in selling shares of an investment 
company to a client by commissions that the broker-dealer is receiving 
from the investment company for portfolio transactions.  The only concern 
of the broker-dealer should be whether the shares in the investment 
company are suitable for the client.  Having said this, the conflicts of 
interest that a broker-dealer faces in these situations are the same as those 
faced by an investment adviser who receives compensation from a product 
provider such as an investment company.
96
 
 
 92.  Id.  “An ‘asset-based sales charge’ is a sales charge that is deducted from the net 
assets of an investment company and does not include a service fee.”  Id. § 2830(a)(8)(A).  
In other words, FINRA is describing fees that are allowed under Rule 12b-1 plans.  
Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,591, 69 Fed. Reg. 54,728, 54,729 n.19 (Sept. 9, 2004); Self-
Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order 
Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Limitation of Asset-Based Sales Charges 
as Imposed by Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release 30,897, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,985, 
30,986 n.9 (July 13, 1992). 
 93.  See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2830(k)(1) (stating “[n]o 
member shall . . . favor . . . the sale or distribution of shares of any any particular investment 
company . . . on the basis of brokerage commissions received or expected . . . .”). 
 94.  See, e.g., John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of 
Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
685, 687–91 (2007) (describing various methods fund managers use to encourage broker-
dealers to favor a fund, such as directed brokerage arrangements, 28(e) soft dollar practices, 
shelf-space agreements, and differential cash compensation). 
 95.  See id.; FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2111. 
 96.  See James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal 
Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for Enhanced 
Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 46–47 (2012) (noting that investment advisers and 
broker-dealers are regulated in very similar ways except for conflict disclosure and 
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In examining the duties of investment advisers under the federal 
securities laws, this Article focuses on the IAA.  In part, this choice is 
driven by the fact that the IAA is the federal statute that captures the largest 
group whose business is premised on investment advice.  The ICA focuses 
on one subset of investment advisers, those who advise registered 
investment companies.
97
  FINRA rules focus on broker-dealers as salesmen 
for securities in investment companies.
98
  In this capacity, broker-dealers 
can certainly render investment advice.  But these broker-dealers do not 
necessarily devote themselves to investment advice.  If they do, then they 
must become dual-registrants, registering under both the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”) and the IAA.
99
  It is the IAA that covers 
all those whose main business is investment advice.
100
 
III. THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER THE 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT 
The definition of investment adviser in section 202(a)(11) is quite 
broad.  It works by sweeping in anyone who offers investment advice in 
any form and then exempting from the definition certain groups, such as 
“publisher[s] of any bona fide . . . financial publication of general and 
regular circulation” and “any broker or dealer whose performance of such 
[advisory] services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a 
broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation” for such 
advisory services.
101
  In addition, certain sections of the IAA apply only to 
registered investment advisers. Section 203(b) exempts from registration 
 
proposing that broker-dealers file a “Form ADV-type” of document regarding conflicts of 
interest so that customers can make more informed decisions about investment advice). 
 97.  See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (2006) 
(defining the term “investment adviser” as an investment adviser to an investment 
company). 
 98.  See James T. Koebel, Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress’ 
Failure to Realize FINRA’s Potential to Restore Investor Confidence, 35 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 61, 64–65 (2010) (describing FINRA’s role in regulating broker-dealers and 
arguing that there is a gap in oversight for investment advisers). 
 99.  See e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 403–04 (2010) (detailing the exclusion from IAA 
registration for broker-dealers who provide advisory services in the context of brokerage 
and noting that brokers who provide advice separate from conventional brokerage are 
ineligible for the exclusion and must dual-register). 
 100.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-202(a)(11) (2006) 
(broadly defining “investment adviser” as any person who advises others on the value of 
securities). 
 101.  Id. § 202(a)(11)(C)–(D). See generally Francis J. Facciolo, When Should a Broker-
Dealer Be Treated as an Investment Adviser?, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 2011, at 4 (describing 
recent cases on the solely-incidental issue). 
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certain types of investment advisers, although this is a smaller group than it 
formerly was.
102
 
As described above in Part III, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
Section 206 – and specifically subsections (1) and (2) – as creating a 
fiduciary standard for investment advisers.
103
  Subsection (1) provides that 
it is “unlawful for any investment adviser . . . to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client.”
104
  
Subsection (2) provides that it is “unlawful for any investment adviser . . . 
to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates 
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”
105
  Each of these 
subsections applies to both registered and unregistered investment 
advisers.
106
 
Beyond these general anti-fraud principles, there is very little in the 
IAA that substantively regulates the contract between an investment 
adviser and its clients that can be seen as reinforcing its fiduciary duty to its 
advisees.  Part IV of this Article explores these limited areas.  There 
certainly are additional restrictions under the IAA, and the rules and 
regulations promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the IAA, on how an 
investment adviser conducts its business and on how it makes disclosures 
to its clients.
107
  But the contract between an investment adviser and its 
 
 102.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2000), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)) (making a major change in section 203(b), effective July 21, 2011, 
requiring registration by many investment advisers who previously had relied on the former 
exemption contained in section 203(b)(3) for an investment adviser who “had fewer than 
fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment 
adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any [registered] investment company.”); see, 
e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, More Than 1,500 Private Fund Advisers 
Registered with the SEC Since Passage of the Financial Reform Law (Oct. 19, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-214.htm [hereinafter SEC Press 
Release] (demonstrating that this change made many once exempt investment advisers 
subject to registration).  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
also requires registration for investment advisers who act as an investment adviser to any 
private fund regardless of client number or the location of clients only within a single state.  
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1).  Dodd-Frank also requires registration for advisers registered with 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a commodity trading adviser but who 
advise a private fund with predominately securities-related advice.  Id. § 80b-3(b)(6)(B) 
 103.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text (recognizing “federal fiduciary 
standards” for investment advisers). 
 104.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
 105.  Id. § 206(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 106.  See id. § 205(a) (“No investment adviser registered or required to be registered 
with the Commission shall . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 107.  Beyond the areas discussed in this Article, registered investment advisers are 
subject, for example, to record keeping obligations (Rule 204-2); certain disclosure 
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clients is remarkably free of restrictions. 
A. Compensation 
The SEC has pursued substantive regulation of investment advisers in 
the IAA in the area of compensation, both as to amount and type. The IAA 
itself contains restrictions on performance fees,
108
 while the regulation of 
the amount of compensation is solely a child of SEC no-action letters.
109
 
1. Excessive Compensation 
The SEC has read a restriction on excessive compensation into the 
IAA through a series of no-action letters in the 1970s.  The SEC continues 
to cite to this restriction in public appearances
110
 despite the fact that there 
has been no further clarification of the SEC’s position in the past forty 
years.  One cannot help but wonder about the “precedential” value
111
 of 
forty-year-old no-action letters that have spawned no follow-up 
jurisprudence other than public statements by SEC staff members and other 
 
obligations to clients and prospective clients (Rule 204-3), a requirement to adopt a code of 
ethics (Rule 204A-1); certain client prospective consent and investment adviser disclosures 
with respect to agency cross transactions (Rule 206(3)-2); restrictions on advertising (Rule 
206(4)-1); custody requirements for customer funds and securities (Rule 206(4)-2); 
restrictions on cash payments for client solicitations (Rule 206(4)-3); restrictions on political 
contributions by certain investment advisers (Rule 206(4)-5); requirements for proxy voting 
of client securities (Rule 206(4)-6); and requirements for compliance programs (Rule 
206(4)-7).  Id. §§ 204, 206. 
   108.    See infra notes 127-141 and accompanying text. 
   109.    See infra notes 110-126 and accompanying text. 
 110.  ROBERT E. PLAZE, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 50 n.256 (2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf. 
 111.  “Precedential” is in quotes because, theoretically, IAA no-action letters and no-
action requests do not bind even the Commission itself with respect to the particular party 
that has written to the Division of Investment Management.  But, as a practical matter, both 
the SEC and the rest of the investment management bar treat no-action letters as precedent, 
citing to earlier letters with regularity in later letters.  The SEC also cites earlier letters in 
releases and enforcement actions.  No-action letters even get cited in court cases as evidence 
of SEC policies.  Finally, earlier letters are used by the private bar as guidance for advice to 
clients.  See, e.g., Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No–Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 
1019 (1987) (opining that, while the precedential effect of no-action responses to 
nonrecipients is less weighty, they may nonetheless be used by anyone engaging in 
materially similar transactions); Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory 
Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 966–990 (1998) (stating that no-action letters and their 
interpretations are received with automatic deference by a majority of judges but that a 
minority of judges will treat no-action letters as merely advisory). 
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members of the investment management bar.
112
 
The earliest of these letters is one from Richard J. Laibinger, Jr., in 
1971.
113
  It also is quite typical of the later letters.  Mr. Laibinger wrote to 
the SEC, requesting permission to charge the fees that he had listed in his 
application for registration as an investment advisor.
114
  He proposed “to 
charge advisory fees of $2,000 minimum for portfolios valued at $30,000 
or less, $3,000 minimum for portfolios valued between $30,000 and 
$50,000 and $4,000 minimum for portfolios valued at $50,000 or more.”
115
  
For these fees, a client would have received “a maximum of six personal 
conferences” and “any special reports” about securities produced by Mr. 
Laibinger.
116
 
In the SEC’s view, such fees were “substantially in excess of the 
prevailing fees charged by other investment advisers offering comparable 
services.”
117
  The SEC expressed skepticism that “any amount of disclosure 
could adequately apprise potential clients of the excessive nature of the 
fees.”
118
  The SEC went beyond this skepticism about disclosure, noting 
that such high fees “appear to be so unconscionably high as to violate the 
applicable anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”
119
 
Later no-action letters rephrase the relationship between the anti-fraud 
provisions and disclosure as it was explained to Mr. Laibinger, but they do 
continue to express skepticism that any amount of disclosure would be 
effective.  In addition, the later letters give an actual figure—two percent—
as to what comparable asset-based fees are,
120
 although the issue has been 
raised whether the SEC should allow for higher fees if there are additional 
services being performed other than standard investment advice.
121
  In light 
 
 112.  Clifford E. Kirsch, Financial Planning, in CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE  245, 248–
49 (Practising Law Institute 2012) (printing a presentation given July 18, 2012 by Kirsch). 
 113.  Richard J. Laibinger, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 WL 7757 (Sept. 11, 1971). 
 114.  Id. at *1 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  The SEC will recharacterize certain service charges as investment advisory fees if 
such service charges are part of what is normally included within an advisory fee.  See 
Standard & Poor’s Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 11120, at *9 (Nov. 23, 1975) 
(“[m]oreover, in determining whether management compensation is so large as to require 
special disclosure, consideration must be given to the total cost to the investor, not merely 
that portion of the management compensation which is labelled [sic] the advisory fee.  It is 
our understanding that investment advisers providing investment supervisory services do not 
normally impose service charges in addition to the advisory fee.”). 
 121.  Scheinman and Bell, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12226, at *2 (Feb. 1, 1976).  
The Knowles & Armstrong, Inc. No-Action Letter is cited in Scheinman and Bell for the 
proposition that “the SEC has, under certain circumstances, permitted an ‘extra charge’ for 
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of the fact that these letters are forty years old, it is hard to know what to 
make of these concerns.  But these 1970s letters continue to be cited by 
SEC staff members and private investment management lawyers without 
any discussion of whether a line should be drawn at two percent or some 
other percentage.
122
 
The later 1970s letters start with the anti-fraud provisions of section 
206 of the IAA, stating the SEC’s view “that the anitfraud [sic] provisions 
in Section 206 of the Act apply to excessive advisory fees.”
123
  The later 
1970s letters differ in how they treat disclosure.  Some letters contemplate 
that otherwise excessive fees might be adequately disclosed to an advisee, 
thus immunizing the investment adviser from a fraud action under section 
206.
124
  Other letters express the SEC’s view that no amount of disclosure 
could be effective.  This latter position seems to stem from the SEC’s view 
that no reasonable investor would ever agree to pay more than what the 
market rate was and, therefore, even if consent was obtained, the disclosure 
must have been inadequate.  As the SEC has stated its view:  
However, even if you were to prepare such a disclosure 
statement, we cannot give you any assurance that, in 
circumstances where the fee charged was more than 2% of the 
assets actually under management, we would not take the 
position that the fee arrangement would violate Section 206 
because it is doubtful whether a client in full possession of all the 
 
the rendition of advice concerning options” and, therefore, a fee of greater than two percent 
could be justified.  Id.  However, Scheinman does not stand for this proposition, as the SEC 
took no position since it had been provided with only “limited facts.”  Id.  Knowles, 
however, cannot be read for this conclusion.  Knowles & Armstrong, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1974 WL 10959 (Apr. 16, 1974).  The no-action applicant in Knowles did propose to 
charge an option fee in addition to its basic one-percent advisory fee.  Id. at *1.  But the 
SEC, in its response granting no-action relief, relied on the fact that these two fees would 
total less than two percent.  Id. at *2 
 122.  See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 248-49 (“The SEC Staff has taken the position that 
advisory fees, in total, that exceed 3.00% per year require additional disclosure essentially 
informing the client that he or she could likely receive comparable services from another 
adviser for a lower fee.”) (footnote omitted) (citing to 1970s no-action letters); Plaze, supra 
note 110, at 50 n.256 (noting that “The [SEC] staff had indicated that it will consider an 
advisory fee greater than 2% of the total assets . . . excessive and would violate section 
206.”). 
 123.  Crystal Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 8418, at *2 (Sept. 10, 1973). 
 124.  The required disclosure has two parts.  First, that the fees being charged are “higher 
than that normally charged in the industry,” and second, “that other advisers can provide the 
same or similar services at lower rates.”  Philip R. Bulliard, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 
WL 10973, at *3 (July 5, 1974).  Procedurally, the SEC has recommended that disclosure 
should be in writing and that “[i]t would be advisable for [the adviser] to receive from each 
such advisory client a written acknowledgment of his receipt and understanding of the 
matters disclosed therein.”  Fin. Counseling Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 7071, 
at *2 (Dec. 7, 1974). 
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facts would consent to such a fee arrangement.”
125
 
The principles of the excessive fee no-action letters have been applied 
by the SEC to several other industry practices, such as directed brokerage 
programs in which advisees do not receive the full benefit of the 
compensation paid by brokers for the business directed to them.  These 
programs raise similar consent issues in the SEC’s view:  
“Unless the full benefits of the adviser’s reduction in expenses 
are passed through to his clients, we cannot envision at this time 
any situation in which implementation of this course of business 
would not result in a breach of fiduciary duty to clients or that a 
client in full possession of all the facts would knowingly consent 
to such arrangement.”
126
 
2. Performance Fees 
Section 205(a)(1) of the IAA, read in conjunction with section 
205(b)(2), provides that certain registered investment advisers may not 
enter into contracts to receive “compensation. . . on the basis of a share of 
capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the 
funds of [a] client.”
127
  However, if the client is a registered investment 
company or if “the contract relates to the investment of assets in excess of 
$1 million,” and if the contract with the registered investment company for 
investment of assets in excess of $1 million provides for what the industry 
calls a “fulcrum fee” arrangement, the restrictions of this section do not 
apply.
128
  The congressional intent behind the prohibition on performance 
 
 125.  Fin. Counseling Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 7071, at *2 (Dec 7, 1974).  
This principle has also been applied by the SEC to an advisee waiving her right to the 
receipt of individualized advice.  See Runyon & Assocs.-Prof’l Consultants, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1974 WL 10993, at *1 (Nov. 17, 1974) (stating “we have some doubt as to 
whether the adviser’s fiduciary duty [to render individualized advice] would be satisfied 
even if disclosure were made that no consideration will be given to other factors” besides 
“‘general stock market direction.’”). 
 126.  Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 12221, at *2 
(Apr. 27, 1973); accord Tex. Inv. Mgmt. Co. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 11847, 
at *1 (Nov. 9, 1973) (stating that “an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty to deal fairly 
with . . . his clients” and directed brokerage conflicts with this duty); see also A. S. Hasen, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10985, at *5 (July 12, 1974) (asserting that subject to 
the investment adviser’s best execution obligations, directed brokerage was allowed where 
advance written notice was given of possible conflict of interest between the investment 
adviser and the advisee, and no brokerage transactions beyond those that would normally 
have occurred were carried out). 
 127.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 205(a)(1), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5(a)(1), 
(b)(2) (2006). 
 128.  Id. at § 205(a)(1), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5(a)(1), 80b-5(b)(2).  There are a 
number of other exceptions built into section 205: one for certain investment advisory 
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fees was to remove the temptation for investment advisers “to take undue 
risks with the funds of clients”
129
 encouraged by “profit-sharing contracts 
which are nothing more than ‘heads I [the investment adviser] win, tails 
you [the advisee] lose’ arrangements.”
130
  In other words, an investment 
adviser could be tempted to gamble with a client’s assets in order to make a 
profit because the gain for the investment adviser from the profit could be 
much larger than the loss of any ongoing asset management fee.
131
  If the 
gamble was unsuccessful, then the client would lose some or all of her 
investments while, at most, the investment adviser would lose some or all 
of any ongoing asset management fee.
132
 
 
contracts with business development companies, one for advisory contracts with investment 
companies where securities holders are all “qualified purchases” at the time of purchase, and 
one for advisory contracts with a non-U.S. resident person.  Id. at § 205(b)(3), (5), (e). 
 129.  H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 29 (1940). 
 130.  S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22 (1940). 
 131.  The original draft of the IAA contained a Declaration of Policy to the effect that 
“the national public interest and the interest [sic] of investors are adversely affected . . . 
when [, among other things,] the compensation of investment advisers is based upon profit-
sharing contracts and other contingent arrangements conducive to excessive speculation and 
trading.”  S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 202 (1940).  This language disappeared from the bill that 
was finally enacted, which focused on establishing that investment advisers were engaged in 
interstate commerce and, thus, were subject to Congressional regulation.  Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 § 201.  The constitutional basis for regulating investment advisers was 
explored in the Senate hearings prior to the finally-enacted bill through discussion about the 
predecessor bill.  See, e.g., Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 3580, 77th Cong. 745–46 (1940) 
(statement of Rudolf B. Berle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of Am., N.Y.C.) 
(testifying that because the industry was so new at the time, it should not be regulated by 
either state or federal authority). 
 132.  The voluminous study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies that the 
SEC released in 1938 and 1939 does not discuss investment counsel, as investment advisers 
were called at the time.  The hearings on the proposed IAA do not provide any further 
illumination on the intent behind the fulcrum fee provisions.  Rather, the hearings before the 
Senate focused on whether there should be any regulation of investment counsel, with 
investment counsel representatives raising concerns that federal regulation would have 
unintended consequences and, most importantly, that investment counsel were professionals 
whose regulation “would represent the first encroachment of the Federal government into 
the domain of personal, professional relationships.”  Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 
3580, 77th Cong. 738 (1940) (statement of Dwight C. Rose, Partner of Brundage, Story & 
Rise, N.Y.C., and President, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of Am.).  By the time the House of 
Representatives held hearings on H.R. 10065, which, with some amendments, was 
eventually enacted, the representative of the investment counsel industry had met with the 
SEC and resolved their objections to the IAA.  Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies: Hearings before a Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 
10065, 76th Cong. 91–93 (1940) (statement of Dwight C. Rose, Partner of Brundage, Story 
& Rise, N.Y.C., and President, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of Am.).  The investment counsel 
representatives had succeeded in preventing incorporation into the IAA of certain provisions 
from the ICA that the representatives felt would give the SEC “unnecessarily broad” 
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The rationale behind the fulcrum fee concept seems clear, although the 
language on how a fulcrum fee arrangement operates is anything but 
clear.
133
  The rationale is that an investment adviser will not be tempted to 
gamble with their client’s assets if the investment adviser’s fee can go 
down as well as up because of such a gamble.  The mechanism of a 
fulcrum fee is easy to understand once one reads a typical industry 
disclosure on how a performance fee works.  A fulcrum fee is the fee 
earned when the investment performance of a registered investment 
company or other fund referenced in section 205(b)(2)(B) equals that of an 
“index of securities prices or such other measure of investment 
performance as the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may specify” 
(the “benchmark”).
134
  From this “point,” i.e., this fulcrum, compensation to 
the investment adviser is decreased or increased with the amount of such 
decrease or increase depending on how the registered investment 
company’s or other fund’s “investment performance” compares to that of 
the selected benchmark. 
The SEC views an incentive-based fee as consisting of two parts:  a 
fulcrum fee and a performance fee.
135
  Sometimes, the term “fulcrum fee” is 
applied to the total fee to be paid to an investment advisor, with the fulcrum 
 
powers. Id. at 92.  The original bill had proposed to incorporate sections from title I of S. 
3580, the predecessor to the ICA, S. 3580 § 203 (“Sections 3, 34(b), 35(b), and (c), 36, 37 
(e) and (f), 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, and 47.”). 
 133.  A fulcrum fee arrangement is one where:  
the contract provides for compensation based on the asset value of the company 
or fund under management averaged over a specified period and increasing and 
decreasing proportionately with the investment performance of the company or 
fund over a specified period in relation to the investment record of an 
appropriate index of securities prices or such other measure of investment 
performance as the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may specify.   
Investment Advisers Act § 205(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2006).  Measurement of 
changes in compensation is calculated as follows:  
the point from which increases and decreases in compensation are measured 
shall be the fee which is paid or earned when the investment performance of 
such company or fund is equivalent to that of the index or other measure of 
performance, and an index of securities prices shall be deemed appropriate 
unless the Commission by order shall determine otherwise.   
Id. at § 205(c).  Finally, an “investment advisory contract” is defined as “any contract or 
agreement whereby a person agrees to act as investment adviser to or to manage any 
investment or trading account of another person other than an investment company 
registered under title I of this Act.”  Id. at § 205(d). 
 134.  Id. at § 205 (b)(2). 
 135.  17 C.F.R. § 275.205-2(c) (2014) (“[T]he specified period over which the asset 
value of the company or fund is averaged for purpose of computing the fulcrum fee may 
differ from the period over which the asset value is averaged for computing the performance 
related portion of the fee. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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fee being divided into two parts: the base fee and the performance fee.
136
  
The performance fee is determined according to a “formula [that] has 
matching maximum and minimum ranges in which the fees can be 
adjusted.”
137
  Finally, if the company or other fund declines in value, but 
the decline is less than the decline in the benchmark, then the investment 
adviser will make more than the fulcrum or base fee.
138
  In other words, to 
use a simplified example, if the company or other fund’s value were to 
increase from $100 to $110 while the benchmark stays stable at $100, the 
investment adviser’s fee would be increased by ten percent.  In contrast, if 
the company or other fund’s value fell to $90, the investment adviser’s fee 
would be reduced by ten percent. 
When enacted, the IAA contained no restriction on performance fees 
paid by an investment company.
139
  In 1970, section 205 was amended to 
cover performance fees paid by a registered investment company, although 
the same set of amendments provided that registered investment 
 
 136.  Dunham Funds defines fulcrum fees globally in the following way:  
A fulcrum fee basically has two parts—the base fee and the performance fee.  In 
a typical fulcrum fee arrangement, the base fee is the pre-determined rate at 
which the sub-adviser is paid when its net performance is in line with that of the 
fund’s benchmark.  The base fee is adjusted up or down by the performance fee, 
which is derived by comparing net fund performance versus that of the fund’s 
benchmark over a rolling twelve-month period, in accordance with pre-
determined rates of adjustment.  In a fulcrum fee arrangement, a sub-adviser is 
rewarded for out-performance or penalized for under-performance in equal 
measure.  Depending on a fund’s net performance versus its benchmark, the 
sub-adviser will receive a fee adjustment in accordance with a formula that 
equates a percentage of out- or under-performance to a percentage of fee 
increases or decreases, respectively.  This formula has matching maximum and 
minimum ranges in which the fees can be adjusted.  In addition, most fulcrum 
fees employ a ‘null zone’ around the base fee, whereby very small differences 
in performance versus the benchmark will not trigger a fee increase or decrease.  
The basic idea of a fulcrum fee is that when fund performance is bad, the 
adviser or sub-adviser should sacrifice some of its fee, and when fund 
performance is good, the fee will increase while still permitting shareholders to 
reap most of the profit.  Under a fulcrum fee arrangement, it is possible that a 
fund could pay a sub-adviser more than the Base Fee, even though the 
performance of the fund is negative.  This situation may occur when the 
performance of the benchmark is worse than the fund’s net performance.   
Dunham Funds, Statutory Prospectus 103 (Form N-1A) (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1420040/000091047212001880/dunham_497.htm. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Pub. L. No. 768, § 205, 54 Stat. 789, 852 (1940) (“As used in this section, 
‘investment advisory contract’ means any contract or agreement whereby a person agrees to 
act as investment adviser or to manage any investment or trading account for a person other 
than an investment company.”) (emphasis added). 
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companies, as well as other persons, could be charged fulcrum fees.
140
  
Congress was concerned that, although performance fee arrangements “are 
not common in the investment company industry, some do exist, and the 
number of contracts appears to be increasing.”
141
 
The limitation on performance fees is a significant restriction on 
investment advisers and, unlike many of the other restrictions discussed in 
this Article, the SEC has not allowed investment advisers to contractually 
vary their restrictions. 
B. Principal Transactions 
Section 206(3) of the IAA provides that an investment adviser may 
not engage in a principal transaction with a client, or act as a broker for a 
third party effecting a transaction with a client, “without disclosing to such 
client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in 
which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such 
transaction.”
142
 There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate 
Congress’ intent in enacting section 206(3).  Originally, section 206, 
including subsection (3), was only applicable to registered investment 
advisers but, in 1960, the limitation to registered investment advisers was 
removed; the restriction now applies to all investment advisers, registered 
or not.
143
 
 
 140.  Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 205, 84 Stat. 1413, 1432 (1970). 
 141.  S. REP NO. 91-184, at 45 (1969); accord H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 41 (1970) 
(proposing an amendment to section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act that would delete 
the exemption for advisory contracts with investment companies from the prohibition 
against contracts that provide for performance fee arrangements).  
 142.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006).  The 
Senate version of the IAA provided more flexibility to investment advisers with respect to 
principal transactions than the House version that was subsequently enacted.  Although it 
required that investment advisers who made principal sales be members of the NASD, the 
Senate version did not require consent from the client and provided that disclosure of the 
investment adviser’s role in the transaction could be given “at or before completion of the 
sale” rather than “before the completion of such transaction.”  S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 206(4) 
(1940). 
 143.  Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 8, 74 Stat. 885, 887 (1960).  The Senate report on the 
amendments provides the following explanation for the extension of section 206 to all 
investment advisers, registered or not: “[s]ection 8 of the bill would amend the introductory 
paragraph of section 206 of the act so as to make the antifraud provisions applicable to all 
investment advisers whether or not registered.  Section 203(b) of the act exempts from 
registration certain investment advisers, primarily those whose business is wholly intrastate 
or whose only clients are investment and insurance companies, or those who have fewer 
than 15 clients and do not hold themselves out generally to the public as investment 
advisers.  While it is reasonable to exempt this group from registration, the reasons for 
exemption from registration do not, in the view of the committee, support a corresponding 
exemption from prohibitions against fraud.  Moreover, under the present wording of the 
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At first blush, section 206(3) would appear to provide an investment 
adviser with substantial flexibility as to such transactions.  For example, on 
its face, the language of section 206(3) would be consistent with a client 
giving blanket permission for future principal transactions.  Since 1945, 
however, the SEC has interpreted Section 206(3) so as to make it very 
restrictive in practice. 
Since 1945, the SEC’s position has been that section 206(3) requires 
“that the disclosure of the capacity in which the investment adviser is 
acting be given in writing and the client’s consent obtained before the 
completion of the transaction.”
144
  In addition, “the requirements of written 
disclosure and of consent contained in this clause must be satisfied before 
the completion of each separate transaction.”
145
  The requirement of 
transaction-by-transaction consent would be particularly burdensome to an 
investment adviser who was also a broker-dealer and, therefore, regularly 
engaged in principal transactions. 
In the current debate over whether a unified fiduciary duty standard 
should be adopted for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, the 
possibility of the restrictions of section 206(3) being applied to brokers and 
dealers has aroused intense opposition from the broker-dealer community.  
The clearest evidence of this opposition are the comment letters that the 
leading American trade organization for broker-dealers, the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), has submitted to 
the SEC in connection with the SEC’s consideration of a unified standard.  
From its very first comment letter in 2010 until its most recent comment 
letter in 2013,
146
 SIFMA has consistently opposed imposition of any 
 
statute, an investment adviser not exempt from registration may escape liability for fraud 
simply by neglecting to register, so that the Commission can only proceed against him for 
having failed to register.”  S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 7 (1960).  The House report summarized 
the reasons behind the change as follows: “[t]his section is now applicable only to registered 
investment advisers.  Fraud is no less vicious because it is perpetrated by an unregistered 
investment adviser.  Just as the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
are applicable to brokers and dealers irrespective of registration, so should the antifraud 
provisions of this act be applicable to all investment advisers.  H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 7 
(1960). 
 144.  Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, relating to section 206 of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and 
section 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 40, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,997, 10,997 (proposed Feb. 5, 1945) (emphasis in original). 
 145.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 146.  Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts Ass’n (SIFMA), Comment Letter to the SEC on Data 
Relating to the Duties of Brokers, Dealers and Investment Advisers 13–14 (July 5, 2013), 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589944317 [hereinafter 2013 SIFMA Letter]; 
SIFMA, Comment Letter to the SEC on the Framework for Rulemaking under the Fiduciary 
Duty Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act 2 (May 4, 2012), http://www.sifma.org/issues/ 
item.aspx?id=8589938634; SIFMA, Comment Letter to the SEC on a Proposed Framework 
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restriction on brokers and dealers with respect to principal transactions that 
might arise from any unified fiduciary standard. 
SIFMA has been concerned that applying the principal trading 
restriction to broker-dealers would prevent broker-dealers from 
“provid[ing] liquidity and best execution to retail customers” in the equity 
and fixed income markets, restrict “retail customers’ . . . access to” 
underwritten public offerings, and present obstacles to a broker-dealer’s 
offering “[a]ffiliated products such as affiliated mutual funds, structured 
products, private equity, and other alternative investments, [that] may 
represent a firm’s best intellectual capital and are important investment 
options for retail customers.”
147
  The solution that SIFMA has suggested is 
“simple and clear disclosure and client consent to material conflicts of 
interest.”
148
  This is exactly the solution that the SEC rejected in 
formulating its approach to principal transactions under section 206(3) of 
the IAA. 
SIFMA relied in part on the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act’s provision 
that any new fiduciary duty standard for broker-dealers was to be “no less 
stringent than the standard applicable to investment advisers under sections 
206(1) and (2) of” the IAA,
149
 leaving out the specific restrictions contained 
in section 206(3).
150
  In separating section 206(1) and (2) from section 
206(3), SIFMA is following the reasoning of the 1945 opinion from the 
SEC’s Director of its Trading and Exchange Division.  Although the 
version of section 206 in effect in 1945 applied only to registered 
investment advisers, the opinion read sections 206(1) and 206(2), as well as 
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as requiring any investment adviser to obtain 
consent to any principal transaction after full disclosure by the investment 
adviser to the client.  But written disclosure prior to such transactions was 
required only of registered investment advisers.
151
 
One has to wonder how long it will take for this disclosure and 
 
for Rulemaking Under Section 913 (Fiduciary Duty) of the Dodd-Frank Act 23 (July 14, 
2011), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589934675; SIFMA, Comment Letter to 
the SEC on Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers 10–11 (Aug. 30, 
2010), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=22263 [hereinafter 2010 SIFMA Letter]. 
 147.  2010 SIFMA Letter, supra note 146, at 10. 
 148.  Id. at 11. 
 149.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 913(g) (2010). 
 150.  2013 SIFMA Letter, supra note 146, at 13 (“Importantly, in omitting any reference 
to Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act in Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress 
intended to preserve for BDs the ability to engage in principal transactions under the 
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct.”). 
 151.  See supra note 144 and accompanying text (expressing the opinion of an SEC 
director regarding required consents for an investment adviser). 
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consent approach to seep into the SEC’s approach to section 206(3).  Some 
signs of the SEC’s flexibility with respect to the proper approach to 
principal transactions is found in Rule 202(a)(11)-1, which “provided, 
among other things, that fee-based brokerage accounts were not advisory 
accounts and were thus not subject to the Advisers Act.”
152
  In response to 
the D.C. Circuit case that vacated this exemptive rule,
153
 the SEC adopted a 
temporary rule to help entities dually-registered as broker-dealers and 
investment advisers to comply with section 206(3).  Subject to a number of 
conditions, the temporary rule allows for prospective client consent to 
principal transactions and for oral client consent to any particular 
transaction.
154
 
C. Limitations of Investment Adviser Liability 
The IAA and ICA prevent an investment adviser from contractually 
limiting liability to its advisees through three routes:  statutory anti-waiver 
provisions,
155
 expansive SEC interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions of 
the IAA to cover hedge clauses,
156
 and limitations on indemnification by 
registered investment companies of their investment advisers.
157
 
 
 152.  Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2653, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022, 55,022 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
 153.  Fin. Planning Ass’n v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 154.  72 Fed. Reg. 55, 022, 55,027–028.  The temporary rule has been extended a 
number of times, most recently through December 31, 2014.  Temporary Rule Regarding 
Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3522, 
77 Fed. Reg. 76,854 (Dec. 31, 2012).  
 155.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 215(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(a); Investment 
Company Act of 1940 § 47(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(a) (2006).  Both sections provide that 
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any 
provision of this subchapter or with any rule, regulation, or order thereunder shall be void.”  
15 U.S.C.  §§ 80a-46(a), 80(b)-15(a).  Similar provisions are found in the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 
77n (2006) (“Any condition, stipulation of provision binding any person acquiring any 
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and 
regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2006) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to 
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, 
or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”). 
 156.  See, e.g., Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 789073, 
at *4 (Feb. 12, 2007) (stating that the SEC refuses to issue further no-action assurances 
regarding hedge clauses). 
 157.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(i) (2006).  Section 
17(i) also applies to a “principal underwriter.”  Id.  (“[N]o contract . . . [for an] investment 
adviser of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment company shall . . . protect 
such person against any liability to such company or its security holders . . . by reason of 
willful malfeasance, bad faith, or gross negligence . . . .”).  A similar provision, section 
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1. Statutory Anti-Waiver Provisions and Limitations on 
Indemnification 
Statutory anti-waiver provisions prevent an advisee of an investment 
adviser from waiving compliance of the investment adviser with its 
obligations under the IAA and the ICA.  In addition, under the ICA, an 
investment adviser to a registered investment company may not be 
protected against any liability arising from anything other than “ordinary 
negligence, mere mismanagement or vicarious fault.”
158
  This prohibition 
normally arises in connection with indemnification provisions entered into 
by a registered investment company in favor of its investment adviser.  In 
the SEC’s view, an indemnification provision that “is not prohibited by 
section 17(h) or (i) might nevertheless bne [sic] invalid as contravening 
some other provision of the federal securities laws, such as section 47(a) of 
the [Investment Company] Act.”
159
  In other words, section 47(a) may 
capture a wider range of prohibited conduct than does section 17(i). 
Section 17(i) has developed a fair amount of SEC gloss, with the SEC 
 
17(h), applies to officers and directors of an investment company.  Id. § 17(h) (“[N]either 
the charter, certificate of incorporation . . . nor the by-laws of any registered investment 
company . . . shall . . .  protect any director or officer of such company against any liability 
to the company or to its security holders . . . by reason of willful malfeasance, bad faith, 
gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the duties involved in the conduct of his office.”). 
 158.  Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d, 294 F.2d 415 (2d 
Cir. 1961). 
 159.  Indemnification by Investment Companies, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,423, 62,423 n.4 (Sept. 
4, 1980) (suggesting that a provision not prohibited by section 17(h) or (i) may still be 
voided by 47(a)).  There does not appear to be any further authority on this point.  The 
closest are two appellate briefs in Sletten v. The Navellier Series Fund, which involved an 
indemnity claim by a trustee arising out of a lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty and 
waste under Delaware law and the ICA.  The initial lawsuit was brought by one of the 
interested trustees and some shareholders of the Navellier Series Fund of which Sletten was 
one of three independent trustees.  Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2001).  
Sletten brought a separate action to enforce his indemnity rights, which the fund resisted on 
the grounds that Sletten had already been paid his expenses by the fund’s insurer and his 
own homeowner’s insurer.  Id. at 933.  The district court held that the fund should receive 
no offset for the payments made by Sletten’s homeowner’s insurer but should receive an 
offset for expenses paid by its insurer.  Sletten v. The Navellier Series Fund, 276 F. Supp. 
2d 1067, 1075 (D. Nev. 2003).  Cross-appeals to the Ninth Circuit followed.  172 Fed. 
Appx. 196 (9th Cir. 2006).  During the cross-appeals, Sletten relied upon section 17(h) to 
support this claim for indemnification of all of his costs.  Relying on sections 1(b)(1), 
1(b)(8), 47(a) and 47(b) of the ICA, The Navellier Series Fund argued that paying all of his 
costs “would violate the purpose and policy of protecting investor interests and acting for 
the interests of investors.”  Appellants’ Opening Brief (First Brief on Cross-Appeal) at 38, 
Sletten v. Navellier Series Fund, 172 Fed. Appx. 196 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-16475).  
However, neither the district court opinion nor the Ninth Circuit’s opinion discussed this 
particular argument.  
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having firm views not only on the phrasing of such indemnities,
160
 but also 
on the “reasonable and fair means for determining whether [such] 
indemnification shall be made,”
161
 and on how advances of “attorneys’ fees 
 
 160.  The indemnity should exclude “any liability . . . arising by reason of willful 
misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of duties as described in 
section 17(h) and (i).”  45 Fed. Reg. at 62,423.  This language tracks the language in section 
17(i), and all of the conduct excluded from indemnification is labeled by the SEC as 
“disabling conduct.”  Id. 
 161.  Id.  
[These] would include (1) a final decision on the merits by a court or other body 
before whom the proceeding was brought that the person to be indemnified 
(‘indemnitee’) was not liable by reason of disabling conduct or, (2) in the 
absence of such a decision, a reasonable determination, based upon a review of 
the facts, that the indemnitee was not liable by reason of disabling conduct, by 
(a) the vote of a majority of a quorum of directors who are neither ‘interested 
persons’ of the company as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the 1940 Act . . . nor 
parties to the proceeding . . . , or (b) an independent legal counsel in a written 
opinion.   
Id. (footnote omitted).  In appropriate circumstances, the SEC independently reviews 
whether “a reasonable determination, based upon a review of the facts,” has been made.  Id.; 
see also Steadman Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 29854, at *7 (Apr. 18, 
1983) [hereinafter Steadman No-Action Letter] (stating that both “[a] majority of a quorum 
of disinterested, non-party trustees of each of the three Funds involved in this matter” 
adopted resolutions finding that the investment adviser had not engaged in any “disabling 
conduct” and legal counsel rendered an opinion that the investment adviser “ha[d] a legal 
right to indemnification, and that payment would be consistent with Section 17 of the 
Act.”).  Additionally, in Steadman, payment under the resolutions was conditioned upon a 
court ordering such payment.  Steadman No-Action Letter, supra, at *2.  The district court 
had denied a summary judgment motion by the investment adviser seeking indemnification 
from the registered investment companies and suggested that the investment adviser seek 
the SEC’s opinion on the legality of any indemnity payments.  Steadman Sec. Corp. v. 
Steadman Associated Fund, No. 82-2241, 1982 WL 1357, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1982).  As 
the investment adviser’s summary judgment motion had been dismissed without prejudice, 
the implication was that the SEC’s opinion would influence the district court’s final 
determination of the indemnification issue. The investment adviser, rather than the 
registered investment companies, wrote to the SEC soliciting its opinion.  Steadman No-
Action Letter, supra, at *2.  The investment adviser made its argument based on the 
language of sections 17(h) and (i), the indemnity sections, and the language of the sections 
that the investment adviser had violated.  Id.  As the violated sections did not contain the 
same language that sections 17(h) and (i) use to describe the “disabling conduct,” the 
investment adviser argued that conduct forbidden by these violated sections was, at best, 
“parallel” or “equivalent” to “disabling conduct,” but was not covered as “disabling 
conduct” because Congress had not used the same language in the indemnity and violated 
sections.  Id.  The SEC rejected this argument, noting that “the nature and character of the 
conduct and violations must be analyzed.”  Id. at *8.  On the basis of the administrative 
proceeding, In re Steadman Security Corporation, 46 S.E.C. 896 (June 29, 1977), the 
opinion of the Fifth Circuit reviewing the order arising from the proceeding, Steadman v. 
S.E.C., 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), the district court record, and the consent order that 
finally terminated the administrative proceeding, the SEC had no difficulty in finding that 
the facts support a “reasonable determination” that the investment adviser’s right to 
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or other expenses incurred by [a registered investment company’s]. . . 
investment adviser” should be handled.
162
 
2. Hedge Clauses 
The SEC’s position on hedge clauses has evolved in light of the IAA’s 
anti-fraud provisions, culminating in the 2007 no-action letter of Heitman 
Capital Management, LLC,
163
 which granted new and unexpected leeway to 
advisers.  In Heitman Capital, the SEC stated that it would no longer 
provide no-action guidance on hedge clauses; therefore, the only avenues 
for further development of the law in this area are the courts and SEC 
enforcement actions.
164
 
Although plaintiffs in a number of cases have raised hedge clauses, 
there has only been one case with a published opinion that addresses the 
effect hedge clauses have on a contract between an investment adviser and 
its advisee.  The Ninth Circuit, in the recent case of Hsu v. UBS Financial 
Services, Inc.,
165
 allowed an investment adviser to legally disclaim its 
liability—or create the perception in the mind of the advisee that the 
adviser has disclaimed its liability—for the actions of an investment 
manager to whom the investment adviser refers an advisee.  This is a 
surprising outcome because recommending an investment manager can 
 
indemnification did not exist.  Id. at *1-*2.  The conduct of the investment adviser fell 
within the “disabling conduct” definition because the state of mind of “the president, 
chairman of the board, and sole beneficial owner” was imparted to the investment adviser, 
supporting the conclusion that the investment adviser acted willfully or with scienter.  Id. 
at*1, *17. 
 162.  45 Fed. Reg. at 62,423.  Advances of “attorneys’ fees or other expenses incurred by 
its. . . investment adviser” are not violations of section 17(i) if the investment adviser 
undertakes to repay any advance “unless it is ultimately determined that he is entitled to 
indemnification.”  Id.  In addition, the registered investment company may not make an 
advance unless it has assurance that such an undertaking will either be met or will be 
unnecessary.  To meet this goal, the SEC has prescribed that one of three conditions must be 
met before an advance can be made:  
“(1) the indemnitee shall provide a security for his undertaking, (2) the 
investment company shall be insured against losses arising by reason of any 
lawful advances, or (3) a majority of a quorum of the disinterested, non-party 
directors of the investment company, or an independent legal counsel in a 
written opinion, shall determine, based on a review of readily available facts (as 
opposed to a full trial-type inquiry), that there is reason to believe that the 
indemnitee ultimately will be found entitled to indemnification.”  
 Id. 
 163.  Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 156. 
 164.  Id. at *4. 
 165.  2011 WL 3443942 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011), aff’d, 507 Fed. Appx. 716 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 266 (mem.) (2013). 
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constitute investment advice under the IAA,
166
 and the disclaimer of 
liability for the recommended manager’s actions is arguably inconsistent 
with the recommending adviser’s broad fiduciary duties.
167
 
The SEC has relied upon two IAA provisions in developing its 
position on hedge clauses.  The first is section 206, the anti-fraud 
provisions, and the second is section 215, the provision voiding certain 
illegal advisory contracts.  Sections 206(1) and 206(2) make it unlawful for 
an investment adviser “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
any client or prospective client,” and/or “to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any 
client or prospective client,” respectively.
168
  Section 215(a) provides that 
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or with any rule, 
regulation, or order thereunder shall be void.”
169
 
 
 166.  See S.E.C. v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2005) aff’d in relevant part, S.E.C. 
v. Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that a company’s 
business of advising clients about different investment managers fell within IAA’s 
definition of investment advice); see also Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to 
Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment 
Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, SEC Interpretive Letter, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 1987 WL 112702 at *3 (Oct. 8, 1987) (“A 
person providing advice to a client as to the selection or retention of an investment manager 
or managers also, under certain circumstances, would be deemed to be ‘advising’ others 
within the meaning of Section 202(a)(11).”); Capital Asset Program, SEC No-Action Letter, 
1974 WL 10950 at *11 (Dec. 1, 1974) (“Since the placing of assets under the management 
of an investment adviser would normally involve investing in securities, advising a client to 
select or dismiss an investment adviser would inherently involve advising such a client as to 
the advisability of investing in securities in general . . . .”); William Bye Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1973 WL 6670 at *3 (Apr. 26, 1974) (describing the SEC’s view that a 
company’s “preparing a periodic quantitative evaluative analysis of the rates of return for 
investment managers it studies, would be ‘advising others . . . as to the value of securities’ 
and issuing ‘analyses or reports concerning securities’ within the meaning of Section 
202(a)(11) of the Act.”). But see Sebastian Assocs., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 
10853 at *3 (Aug. 7, 1975) (recommending no action based on representations that 
company assisted clients in retaining “outside specialists,” including estate planning 
attorneys and “reputable investment advisers or financial consultants”); Hudson Valley 
Planning, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12359 at *2 (Feb. 25, 1978) (stating that a 
“Consultant” to an employee benefit plan’s clients is not required to register as an 
investment adviser, where the consultant primarily drafted and analyzed data-drive 
questionnaires of a client’s investment advisers, and only incidentally provided, upon a 
client’s request, generalized information as to investment advisers capable of fulfilling the 
client’s needs, and did not recommend a specific adviser or provide general advice about 
investments.).  
 167.  See S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) 
(addressing the duties that investment advisers owe their clients). 
 168.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1)–(2). 
 169.  Id. at § 80b-15(a). 
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The SEC’s first statement on hedge clauses came in a 1951 Opinion of 
the General Counsel.
170
  The hedge clauses addressed in the general 
counsel’s opinion related to literature used by both broker-dealer and 
investment advisers containing recommendations or information on 
particular securities.  Such publications contained statements to the effect 
“that the information furnished is obtained from sources believed to be 
reliable but that no assurance can be given as to its accuracy,” with 
occasional added language “to the effect that no liability is assumed with 
respect to such information.”
171
  Concerned that a hedge clause would 
“create in the mind of the investor a belief that he has given up legal rights 
and is foreclosed from a remedy which he might otherwise have either at 
common law or under the” federal securities laws, the general counsel 
opined that a hedge clause or similar provision violates section 206’s anti-
fraud provisions (and other SEC statutes) if it “is likely to lead an investor 
to believe that he has in any way waived any right of action he may 
have.”
172 
Over time, the hedge clause language was generalized by broker-
dealers and investment advisers to contracts with advisees beyond the 
literature context.  The added language disclaiming liability mentioned in 
the general counsel’s opinion is what the SEC has focused on in a series of 
no-action letters and enforcement actions.  Hedge clauses remain very 
common in the investment adviser industry.  In the first half of 2013, hedge 
clauses that triggered a finding of contractual deficiency were commonly 
found in state and Canadian provincial examinations of investment 
advisers.
173
 
Until 2007, the SEC, through a series of no-action letters and 
enforcement actions, took a very restrictive position on what a permissible 
hedge clause was.  Essentially, the SEC reasoned that the anti-fraud 
provisions of the IAA contained in sections 206(1) and 206(2) were 
 
 170.  Opinion of General Counsel, Relating to Use of “Hedge Clauses” by Brokers, 
Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Others, SEC Interpretive Letter, 16 Fed. Reg. 3387 
(proposed Apr. 10, 1951). 
   171.    Id. 
   172.    Id.  The general counsel was concerned with hedge clauses under the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as the IAA.  But, as indicated in 
the main text, this Article examines hedge clauses only in the context of the IAA. 
 173.  N. Am. Sec. Adm’s Ass’n, 2013 Coordinated Investment Adviser Exams (Oct. 
2013), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/IA-Sweep-2013-Final.pdf.  One 
thousand one hundred thirty investment advisers were examined (primarily between January 
1, 2013, and June 30, 2013), revealing 6,482 deficiencies.  Id. at 5.  Of the 6,482 total 
deficiencies, 791 were “Contract Deficiencies,” 9% of which (approximately 71) involved 
hedge clauses.  Id. at 12.  From the figures it is impossible to tell whether 71 investment 
advisers used improper hedge clauses or whether there were multiple agreements involving 
the same investment advisers with improper hedge clauses. 
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violated any time a hedge clause attempted to limit investment adviser 
liability for negligence or malfeasance by using such adjectives as “gross” 
or “willful” to qualify what type of investment adviser negligence or 
malfeasance might trigger liability to an advisee.
174
  The no-action letter 
issued to Heitman Capital Management, LLC in 2007 marked a turn in the 
SEC’s position and declared, for the first time, that such qualifications are 
not per se violations of sections 206(1) and 206(2).
175
  Rather, the Heitman 
Capital no–action letter announced that whether a particular hedge clause is 
“mislead[ing] [as to] any particular [c]lient” can only be answered by a 
“fact-intensive . . . inquiry” that focuses on an advisee’s “particular 
circumstances,” the “relationship and communications between” the 
investment adviser and the advisee, and “the form and content of the hedge 
clause.”
176
 
It was not until the 1970s that the SEC first began to give some 
content to the 1951 opinion of its general counsel.  In various no-action 
letters, the SEC separately rejected attempts to disclaim investment adviser 
liability for “ordinary negligence,”
177
 to limit such liability to “gross 
negligence or willful malfeasance,”
178
 and to limit such liability to “acts 
done in bad faith.”
179
  The SEC has pointed out that the use of adjectives to 
qualify liability for negligence or malfeasance may violate section 206 
because there may be situations where applicable law requires a greater 
degree of care by a fiduciary, and that, accordingly, the agreement should 
at least state that the advisor was not disclaiming liability for “violation[s] 
of applicable law.”
180
  One way used by an investment adviser to clarify 
such waivers has been to include a statement to the effect that an advisee 
has not waived his rights under the federal securities law or state law.  The 
 
   174.    See, e.g., Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10979, at 
*2 (Feb. 8, 1974) (noting that “the use of the adjectives ‘gross’ and ‘wilful’ [sic] in the 
second paragraph . . . appears to violate Section 206 of the Act . . .”). 
 175.  Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 156. 
 176.  Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 156, at *5. 
 177.  Jonathan-Forbes Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 7681, at *2 (Mar. 20, 
1972). 
 178.  Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., supra note 174 at *1 (Feb. 8, 1974) (emphasis 
added); see also Omni Mgmt. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 12077, at *1 (Dec. 
13, 1975) (determining it is impermissible to use “gross” to qualify negligence or 
malfeasance). 
 179.  First Nat’l Bank of Akron, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
80,441 (Feb. 27, 1976). 
 180.  Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc. No-Action Letter, supra note 174 at *2; see also, 
First Nat’l Bank of Akron No-Action Letter, supra 179 (explaining that even a clause 
explicitly providing that rights under federal or state law cannot be relinquished may still be 
misleading; if the hedge clause purports to limit liability to bad faith or willful misconduct, a 
client who is unsophisticated in the law may not realize that he may still have a right of 
action under federal or state law even where the adviser acts in good faith.). 
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SEC has made clear that reference merely to the federal securities laws is 
not adequate.
181
 
Even such a non-waiver statement was not necessarily adequate in the 
SEC’s view, however.  As the SEC understood fiduciary law, an advisee 
“may have a right of action under federal or state law even where his 
adviser has acted in good faith.”
182
  The SEC pointed out in one no-action 
letter that the combination of a non-waiver statement with a disclaimer of 
an investment adviser’s liability for gross or willful conduct might lead an 
“unsophisticated” advisee to believe it had no legal rights for any actions 
undertaken by an investment adviser.
183
 
The SEC has never addressed the issue of whether exculpatory clauses 
other than those discussed to this point might be permissible.  But the State 
of Connecticut did so when it stated in a release that exculpatory provisions 
relieving an investment adviser of its “liability for losses caused by 
conditions and events beyond its control such as war, strikes, natural 
disasters, new government restrictions, market fluctuations, 
communications disruptions, etc. . . . are acceptable since they do not 
attempt to limit or misstate the adviser’s fiduciary obligations to its 
 
 181.  James Inv. Research, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 12791, at *1 (Apr. 10, 
1977); Omni Mgmt. No-Action Letter, supra note 178, at *1.  As with all disclosure, the 
SEC is also concerned that a hedge clause not be misleading because it could be read in 
several different ways by an advisee.  See O.T.C. Fact Sheets, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,926 (July 4, 1972) (declaring a statement in a publication providing 
information about certain companies that the information “‘is believed reliable, but due to 
possible typesetting errors its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed’ is 
misleading inasmuch as it implies that typesetting errors are the only possible cause of 
inaccuracy or incompleteness . . . .”); James Inv. Research, Inc., supra, at *1 (suggesting 
moving the statement that an advisee did not waive any of its legal rights so that it was clear 
that this non-waiver also applies to a statement that the investment adviser was not liable for 
any act by an agent). 
 182.  First Nat’l Bank of Akron, supra note 179; accord Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., 
supra note 174, at *1 (clarifying that the relationship between an investment advisor and his 
client is governed by statutory law as well as common law principles that apply to fiduciary 
relationships).  In its response to the Auchincloss no-action request, the SEC suggested not 
only deleting the adjectives “gross” and “willful” from the hedge clause, but also adding the 
statement that “‘[t]he federal securities laws impose liabilities under certain circumstances 
on persons who act in good faith, and therefore nothing herein shall in any way constitute a 
wavier or limitation of any rights which the undersigned may have under any federal 
securities laws.’”  Id., at *2.  Although it is puzzling why this suggested addition did not 
include a reference to applicable state law, the SEC’s concern about ensuring that there is no 
misunderstanding of the waiver by an advisee is clear.  Shortly after the Auchinloss no-
action letter, Auchincloss & Lawrence wrote to the SEC indicating that, rather than 
incorporate the revisions that the SEC no-action letter suggested, it was deleting and not 
replacing the subject exculpatory language from all of its existing and future proposed 
advisory contracts.  Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 79,762 (Apr. 5, 1974). 
 183.  First Nat’l Bank of Akron, supra note 179. 
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clients.”
184
  This conclusion is consistent with the reasoning behind the 
SEC’s no-action letters. 
In addition to the above-cited no-action letters, the SEC has instituted 
three enforcement actions that penalized advisors for using hedge clauses, 
among other violations, although none of these actions provides much 
additional guidance on what makes a hedge clause problematic.  In the two 
earliest actions from 1979 and 1981, the SEC did not describe the content 
of the hedge clauses or why they were objectionable.
185
  In 1994, the SEC 
brought an enforcement action alleging, among other violations, that the 
adviser’s agreements contained a paragraph purporting to limit the 
adviser’s liability to “gross negligence or willful misconduct,” although the 
SEC still provided no explanation of why the hedge clause was 
problematic.
186
 
There also is a well-developed body of state administrative law 
adopting the SEC’s approach to limitations on hedge clauses and applying 
it to state registered investment advisers.
187
  In part, this is a function of the 
facts that many state securities laws governing investment advisers are 
modeled on the IAA
188
 and that the anti-fraud provisions of section 206 of 
the IAA are not limited to investment advisers registered with the SEC. 
 
 184.  CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, SEC. AND BUS. INVS. DIV., INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
CAUTIONED ON USE OF HEDGE CLAUSES (May 1991), 
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2252&q=299222.  
 185.  See, e.g., Olympian Fin. Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 659, 16 
SEC Docket 801 (Jan. 16, 1979) (finding violations related to deceptive advertising, failure 
to maintain required books and records, etc.); William Lee Parks, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 736, 21 SEC Docket 342 (Oct. 27, 1980) (ordering administrative proceedings 
against William Lee Parks for overcharging clients, failure to refund clients, etc.). 
 186.  Wall St. Money Mgmt. Grp., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1464, 58 
SEC Docket 1953, 1956 (Jan. 30, 1995). 
 187.  For examples of state administrative law limitations on hedge clauses, see WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE § 460-24A-220(19) (2014); ALASKA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE DIVISION’S 
STATE INVESTMENT ADVISOR EXAM FUNCTION, http://commerce.alaska.gov/dnn/dbs/ 
Securities/ComplianceforStateInvestmentAdvisers.aspx; CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, supra 
note 184; Wall St. Money Mgmt. Grp., Inc., Ill. Secs. Dep’t, 1996 WL 390495 (Feb. 
21,1996); S.C. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., SECS. DIV., INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATION 
PROGRAM OVERVIEW, http://2hsvz0l74ah31vgcm16peuy12tz.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/examoverview.pdf; Henry C. Brock, Docket No. SD 03-0007, 
Utah Dep’t of Commerce (Apr. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.securities.utah.gov/dockets/03000732.pdf; Jay Fishman, Maine’s Take on 
Investment Adviser Hedge Clauses and Assets Under Management, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD 
OF SECS. REGULATION (Jan. 3, 2008), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2008/01/maines-
take-on-investment-adviser-hedge.html.  
 188.  CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, supra note 184 (“Inasmuch as there appears to be no 
relevant Connecticut case law, it is appropriate to look to federal authorities since the 
antifraud provisions in Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act . . . and Section 36b-5(a) 
of CUSA [the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act] are largely identical.”). 
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The “hedge clause” doctrine and the 1951 general counsel’s opinion 
have been cited by the SEC in other areas of investment adviser regulation 
where, in the SEC’s view, an advisee might be misled into believing that he 
or she had no rights arising from the fiduciary duties owed by an 
investment adviser to its advisees.  For example, in a 1984 no-action letter, 
the SEC stated that a provision in a year-to-year advisory contract 
providing that the advisee could only elect to terminate the contract once a 
year (on the contract’s anniversary) was fraudulent and deceptive under the 
IAA.
 189
  The fiduciary relationship between investment adviser and advisee 
was built on confidence, the SEC explained.
190
  If that confidence was lost, 
a provision in the contract requiring the further rendering of services, even 
if they were not satisfactory, “raise[d] serious questions” under the IAA’s 
anti-fraud provisions.
191
  The SEC stated that a provision denying a client’s 
right to terminate the contract was invalid because “the contract might lead 
the client to believe that he is not entitled to terminate the contract when 
fiduciary principles indicate that he has that right.”
192
 
Based on the SEC’s actions, and especially the no-action letters, one 
could have read the agency’s position on hedge clauses to be very 
restrictive in setting limits on the contractual rights of an investment 
adviser and its advisee to negotiate disclaimers of liability.  But this is not 
the SEC’s current position on hedge clauses, as it made clear in Heitman 
Capital Management, LLC, a seminal no-action letter.
193
  Heitman Capital 
sought guidance on a hedge clause in which an advisee indemnified 
Heitman Capital and other investment advisers affiliated with Heitman 
Capital.  Exceptions were made, however, for “grossly negligent, reckless, 
willfully improper or illegal conduct in its performance”; “actions outside 
the scope of [the] Manager’s authority”; or “other material breach under” 
 
 189.  Robert D. Brown Inv. Counsel, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 48400, at *2 
(July 19, 1984). 
 190.  Id. at *1. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at *2.  A similar sort of approach had been taken by the SEC in response to 
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts between investment advisers and advisees.  In a 
1986 no-action letter, the SEC indicated that such clauses might violate section 206 of the 
IAA because they might “mislead clients to believe that they are barred from exercising 
their rights under the Act.”  McEldowney Fin. Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 
67330, at *1 (Oct. 17, 1968).  But the SEC has acknowledged that this position might no 
longer be good law: “Those positions, however, largely predated Supreme Court decisions 
upholding pre-dispute arbitration clauses under the federal securities laws, and a subsequent 
federal district court opinion citing those decisions upheld the validity of a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause in an advisory client agreement.” 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers 
& Broker-Dealers, supra note 9, at 43–44.  The SEC was referring to Bakas v. Ameriprise 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000–1001 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 193.  Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 163. 
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the advisory contract.
194
  In addition to this hedge clause, the agreement 
also contained a “non-waiver of rights” provision: “Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, nothing” in the agreement was to “constitute a waiver” of any of 
the client’s “legal rights under applicable U.S. federal securities laws or 
any other laws whose applicability is not permitted to be contractually 
waived.”
195
 
In its letter to the SEC, Heitman Capital asserted that its clients were 
primarily institutional investors such as large pension funds that were 
“sophisticated persons that have the resources and experience to understand 
the investment advisory agreements with the applicable Heitman Advisor, 
and the bargaining power to negotiate, and in some cases even dictate, the 
terms of the investment advisory agreements.”
196
  In addition, some 
Heitman Capital investment advisers provided advice to wrap account and 
certain commingled fund entities that were represented by financial 
intermediaries with allegedly similar levels of sophistication and 
bargaining power.
197
  Heitman Capital also contended that most of these 
financial intermediaries had a separate responsibility to negotiate with 
Heitman Capital in the best interests of their underlying clients and assist 
their clients in evaluating the advisory agreement, including the hedge 
clause and non-waiver disclosure.
198
 
The SEC Division of Investment Management’s response noted 
Heitman Capital’s representations, and reiterated the general principle that 
“all of the surrounding facts and circumstances” must be taken into account 
in determining whether an adviser’s hedge clause purporting to limit 
adviser liability to acts of gross negligence or willful malfeasance violates 
section 206.
199
  In this analysis, the SEC wrote that it would consider “[(1)] 
the form and content of the particular hedge clause (e.g., its accuracy) . . . 
[(2)] communications between the investment adviser and the client about 
the hedge clause, and [(3)] the particular circumstances of the client.”
200
  
Where a client was “unsophisticated” in the law, relevant factors would 
include whether the hedge clause was “written in plain English,” 
“individually highlighted and explained during an in-person meeting,” and 
whether “enhanced disclosure was provided to explain” when a client may 
still have a right of action.
201
  In light of these general principles and 
Heitman Capital’s factual representations, the SEC’s response indicated 
 
 194.  Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
 195.  Id. at *2. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at *2–3. 
 199.  Id. at *4. 
 200.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 201.  Id. 
FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:21 PM 
2014] DO I HAVE A BRIDGE FOR YOU 141 
 
that Heitman Capital’s use of a hedge clause and non-waiver disclosure 
“would not per se violate sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the [IAA].”
202
  The 
letter emphasized, however, that the SEC was taking no position and could 
give no assurance on whether the advisory agreement was misleading (and 
therefore illegal) as applied to any particular client “because of the fact-
intensive nature of the inquiry.”
203
 
In its no-action request, Heitman Capital relied on an interpretation of 
state law, including that of New York, to the effect that agreements 
relieving a party of liability for its negligence will be enforced.  Although 
the SEC response made no mention of this interpretation, this type of 
reasoning is implicit in the SEC’s statement that a hedge clause and non-
waiver disclosure of the type used by the Heitman Capital investment 
advisers are not per se violations of the IAA.  In other words, in the SEC’s 
view, such limitations of liability are apparently permitted if the normal 
standards for modifying fiduciary duties, full disclosure and informed 
consent by the beneficiary are met.
204
 
Since the SEC indicated in Heitman Capital that it would not be 
issuing further no-action or interpretive assurances under sections 206(1) or 
206(2) of the IAA regarding an adviser’s use of any particular hedge 
clause, the only places in which further developments can occur are SEC 
enforcement actions or court cases brought either by the SEC or advisees 
themselves.  Since Heitman Capital, there have been no SEC enforcement 
actions on the subject.  One published case briefly mentions a hedge clause 
issue, but was decided on other grounds.
205
  In addition, there are a handful 
of cases in which the issue has been raised in the pleadings but have not 
resulted in decisions or orders in which the issue has been discussed.
206
  
 
 202.  Id. at *5 (emphasis in original). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“We only reaffirm 
here the most basic principle that a court will not countenance the behavior of a fiduciary 
who, without full disclosure and consent, enters into a financial arrangement placing his 
spouse’s interests at odds with the interests of those to whom he owes a duty of undivided 
loyalty.”). 
 205.  Kleinman v. Oak Assocs., Ltd., No. 5:07CV0698, 2007 WL 2071968 (N.D. Ohio 
July 16, 2007).  
 206.  See, e.g., Bruck v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 967 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422 
(D. Mass. May 23, 2013) (granting motion to compel arbitration of claims that defendants 
“created ‘an unlawful and fraudulent scheme to avoid the fiduciary duties imposed upon 
them by the’” IAA, allegedly in connection with an account improperly designated “non-
fiduciary” by defendants); Trial Pleading at 15, Bruck v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, 
LLC, 967 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D. Mass. 2013) (No. 12-12005), 2012 WL 5424954 (Count XII) 
(stating “[d]efendants falsely asserted, to avoid legal [scrutiny] that they were not subject to 
the IAA because they were ‘brokers.’”); see also Gramercy Advisors, LLC v. Jones, No. 07 
Civ. 2809 (LMM), 2007 WL 2729021 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007) (deferring consideration of 
plaintiff and defendants’ motions pending a ruling on jurisdiction); Reply Memorandum in 
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There has been, however, one published case substantively treating hedge 
clauses: Hsu v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.
207
 
In Hsu, the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court 
determination that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under IAA when he 
contended that UBS had used an illegal hedge clause in its contracts with 
him and other clients.
208
  The Hsu decisions reflect a failure by the plaintiff 
to clearly connect UBS’ fiduciary obligations as an investment adviser, 
which it became by recommending a list of investment managers to its 
advisees, to its disclaimer of liability for the actions of the investment 
managers it recommended. 
The plaintiff in Hsu was an individual investor advisee who was 
seeking class certification for similarly situated advisees.  He had entered 
into a contract to participate in UBS’ “wrap” fee program, which consisted 
of investment advisory, execution, clearing and custodial services for a 
single fee.
209
  Under the arrangement, the plaintiff was provided the 
opportunity to select an investment manager for his wrap fee arrangement, 
and given a list of potential investment managers for this purpose by 
UBS.
210
  Although the parties disputed whether UBS required participants 
in its wrap program to choose an investment adviser from lists created by 
UBS,
211
 there is no doubt that UBS, as sponsor of the wrap fee program, did 
 
Further Support of Motion to Defer Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Gramercy 
Advisors, LLC v. Jones, No. 07 Civ. 2809 (LMM), 2007 WL 2729021 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2007) (requesting the court to rule on whether it has jurisdiction over Gramercy before 
ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment); Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to 
Preliminarily Enjoin Arbitration Proceedings, Wootten v. Fisher Invs., Inc., No. 4:10-cv-
00598 SNLJ, 2010 WL 4062991 (E.D. Mo. July 9, 2010). 
 207.  No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011), 
aff’d, Hsu v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 507 F. App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 
266 (mem.) (Oct. 2013).  The district court opinion also raised statute of limitations issues 
as to sections 206 and 251(a) of the IAA. 
 208.  Hsu, No. 11–17131, 2013 WL 492443 at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2013) (concluding 
that the governing law on this hedge clause issue is unclear from the pleadings in Hsu). 
 209.  Hsu, No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011). 
 210.  Id. at *1–2. 
 211.  Compare Appellee’s Brief at 15, Hsu, 2012 WL 729581, No. 11-17131 (“UBS 
does not ‘require that all investment managers be from its approved list,’ nor does it make a 
‘manager referral.’  Rather, as noted, the [Wrap Account] Agreement plainly states the 
client is free to select an Investment Manager that is not on the list and that UBS expresses 
no opinion about the capabilities of the listed firms.”) with Appellant’s Opening Brief at 22, 
Hsu, 2013 WL 492443, No. 11-17131 (“‘Investment Advisor [the Manager] and investment 
strategy must be on . . . the [MAC] Reviewed Advisor List.’”) (emphasis in original).  The 
plaintiff attached to his complaint what were allegedly UBS’ internal guidelines indicating 
that the advisee must select someone from the UBS pre-approved list.  First Amended Class 
Action Complaint, Exhibit D, at 2, Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942 (“Investment Advisor and 
investment strategy must be on either the MAC Researched Advisor List or the Reviewed 
Advisor List.”). 
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provide the plaintiff with a list of UBS approved investment managers 
because the plaintiff selected Horizon Asset Management Services, LLC 
(“Horizon”) as its investment manager from the list that UBS provided.
212
  
The plaintiff’s complaint was based on UBS’ apparent disclaimer of 
liability for the third-party investment manager Horizon’s actions.
213
 
The plaintiff sought rescission of the wrap fee contracts and 
“restitution [from UBS] of all fees and other consideration paid to 
Defendant” by all class members.
214
  To show that UBS unlawfully limited 
its liability, the plaintiff’s main argument compared the language 
describing the wrap fee program and UBS’ obligations to advisees in 
different provisions of the wrap fee contract with a disclosure brochure 
describing the program.
215
  On the one hand, the plaintiff noted the 
disclosure brochure stated that UBS was the plaintiff’s “[i]nvestment 
[a]dvisor” with a “fiduciary relationship” to the plaintiff, and subject to the 
legal standards of the IAA.
216
  On the other hand, the plaintiff pointed out 
the wrap fee contract contained a hedge clause with respect to the third-
party investment manager:  UBS, the wrap fee contract stated, “may or may 
not have researched” the investment manager the plaintiff selected.
217
  In 
addition, the wrap fee contract stated that UBS:  
shall not be liable for and Client agrees to hold UBS Financial 
Services Inc. harmless against all losses to the Client from any 
error of judgment, mistake of law, negligence, willful 
misfeasance, or bad faith on the part of the Investment Manager 
or any other matter within the Investment Manager’s control such 
as . . . compliance with applicable law.
218
   
The disclosure brochure contained a similar waiver of UBS’ fiduciary 
obligations:  
[UBS’] analysis of MAC Reviewed Managers is limited in scope 
and does not provide enough information for us to express an 
opinion regarding the investment capabilities of the firm.  The 
limited analysis is performed once and provides a broad overview 
of the manager’s organizational structure and history, together 
with information about their assets under management, net worth 
 
 212.  Hsu, No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011). 
    213.   Id. 
 214.  Class Action Complaint at 2, ¶ 4, Hsu, 2011 WL 1593366 (N.D.Cal. filed Apr. 27, 
2011) (Trial Pleading). 
 215.  Id. at 6–8, ¶¶ 23–31. 
 216.  Id. at 6, ¶ 24. 
 217.  Id. at 6, ¶ 25. 
 218.  Id. at 7, ¶ 27. 
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and regulatory record, and is not updated.
219
 
The district court granted UBS’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, agreeing with UBS that it did not disclaim any duties owed to the 
plaintiff and that it had not required the plaintiff to waive any rights under 
the IAA.
220
  Essentially, the district court observed, the plaintiff’s argument 
was that UBS stated that it was a fiduciary and that its hedge clause 
disclaimed liability for conduct by Horizon, Hsu’s investment manager.  
The plaintiff argued that while these two provisions may have been clear 
when read in isolation, they were contradictory and misleading when read 
together.  The district court, however, held that the hedge clause was not 
“incongruous” with the other terms of the contract, and, therefore, was not 
deceptive.
221
  The district court explained:  “[t]he contract never disclaimed 
liability for UBS’s own role as an investment advisor [sic].  Rather, it 
disclaimed liability for any misconduct on behalf of Horizon, Hsu’s 
separate investment manager.”
222
 
In ruling that UBS was permitted to disclaim liability for Horizon’s 
misconduct under these circumstances, the district court’s ruling seemed 
vulnerable to appeal.  Recommendations regarding whether to select a 
particular investment adviser can qualify one as an investment adviser 
under the IAA.  If a fiduciary recommends a particular investment adviser 
who should not have been recommended, then there could be a violation of 
the recommender’s fiduciary duties, and, specifically, the recommending 
fiduciary’s duty of care.  As an agent, the fiduciary “has a duty to the 
principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally 
exercised by agents in similar circumstances,” and, in evaluating whether 
that standard has been met, “[s]pecial skills or knowledge possessed by 
[the] agent” are to be taken into account.
223
  On the one hand, while 
fiduciaries are generally not deemed “insurers” of a particular result or the 
acts of others,
224
 the duty of care can impose liability for the acts of others, 
provided the injurious act of the third party was foreseeable and the 
imposition of liability is fair under the circumstances.
225
 
 
 219.  Id. at 7–8, ¶ 28. 
 220.  Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942, at *1, 7. 
 221.  Id. at 9. 
 222.  Id. at 9–10. 
 223.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (noting that fiduciaries have 
“an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’ 
as well as an affirmative obligation ‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading . . . .’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 224.  Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981) (“Generally directors 
are accorded broad immunity and are not insurers of corporate activities.”). 
 225.  See, e.g., Call v. Czaplicki, No. 09-6561, 2010 WL 3724275 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 
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In the investment advisory context, it can be argued that the damaging 
actions of another adviser recommended by the principal adviser are 
foreseeable.  The principal adviser’s professional responsibilities 
necessarily relate to the advisory services the third party is to provide to the 
client.  The disclaimer of liability by an investment adviser for the actions 
of another investment manager whom the adviser recommends seems 
potentially inconsistent with the investment adviser’s fiduciary obligations.  
Additionally, applying the Heitman Capital principles to Hsu, if UBS had a 
fiduciary duty of care with respect to its selection of recommended 
investment managers, then it seems likely that the various exculpatory 
statements could confuse an advisee into thinking that he or she had no 
cause of action against UBS for its choosing to include specified 
investment managers in its recommended list. 
At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff did not expressly argue, 
and the district court did not render a ruling on, whether UBS owed a 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in connection with the list of investment 
managers UBS provided.  Rather, the district court held that there was “no 
contradiction” between the statements that UBS owed a fiduciary duty to 
the plaintiff and the exculpatory provisions in its hedge clause.
226
  Implicit 
in the district court’s conclusion is that UBS and the plaintiff had the 
contractual power to limit UBS’ fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.  The 
limitation of UBS’ fiduciary duties is demonstrated by the apparent lack of 
UBS’ responsibility for its list of recommended investment managers or the 
actions of any such investment manager selected by one of UBS’ clients. 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff did clearly argue that “the 
recommendation of an investment manager to a client generally qualifies as 
an advisory service and is subject to” the IAA.
227
  UBS countered that “Hsu 
erroneously assumes that UBS engages in investment advisory services 
merely by providing a list of Investment Managers to clients,” and that, 
“irrespective of whether UBS’s mere provision of a list of Investment 
Managers constitutes an advisory service,” its “disclaimer of liability” for 
Horizon’s conduct did not contradict the other contract provisions of UBS’ 
 
2010) (motion granted in part and denied in part) (declining to rule that an insurance agent 
has a duty of reasonable investigation of an attorney who insurance agent refers to a client 
because, in contrast to insurance agent’s duty to procure adequate insurance, the insurance 
agent does not have qualifications to understand whether a particular attorney is competent); 
Call v. Czaplicki, 2011 WL 2532712 (D.N.J. June 23, 2011) (reconsideration granted in part 
and denied in part). 
 226.  Hsu, No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011). 
 227.  Appellant’s Reply Brief, Hsu v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-17131, 2013 WL 
492443 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 11, 2013), at *6; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 6, Hsu, 
2013 WL 492443. 
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fiduciary duties.
228
 
It was UBS’ argument that ultimately prevailed, as the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.  In a brief, four-paragraph decision 
not selected for publication, the court ruled that the plaintiff failed to satisfy 
the pleading requirements of Rule 9 by stating what is false or misleading 
about a statement and why it is misleading.  The plaintiff, therefore, failed 
to put UBS on fair notice of the claim.
229
 
According to the Ninth Circuit, while the plaintiff asserted that UBS 
deceived clients by leading them to believe that they waived certain 
“‘unwaivable fiduciary duties’” through the hedge clauses, the plaintiff 
“never identifies or explains what those ‘unwaivable fiduciary duties’ 
are . . . HSU’s claim fails because the clauses he points to do not waive 
compliance with any provision of the IAA.”
230
  Judging by the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, it appears that despite the plaintiff’s references to the 
fiduciary duty owed by UBS to the plaintiff, based on its list of 
recommended investment managers in both the plaintiff’s opening and 
reply briefs to the Ninth Circuit, the point was lost on the panel. 
The Ninth Circuit also refused to consider the plaintiff’s argument 
that, in practice, UBS allegedly required clients to use an investment 
manager from the UBS pre-approved list, calling this an argument raised 
for the first time on appeal.
231
  This is puzzling because the plaintiff, in both 
his complaint and his opposition to UBS’ motion to dismiss, had cited an 
internal UBS document that ostensibly required that the investment 
manager be on UBS’ pre-approved list.
232
  It can be argued, from the 
pleadings and opposition to the motion to dismiss, that UBS’ policy 
requiring the plaintiff to select an adviser from the list was not central to 
the plaintiff’s contention that UBS violated the anti-fraud provision (that 
was the language of the hedge clauses themselves).  The Ninth Circuit’s 
refusal to consider the argument, however, worked a particularly harsh 
result, given that the plaintiff referenced the point below, and its close 
relation to the hedge clauses and fiduciary duty issues raised in the 
 
 228.  Appellee’s Brief, supra note 211, at *19.  
   229.    Hsu v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 507 F. App’x, 716 (9th Cir. 2013) 
 230.  Id. at 716-17. 
 231.  Id. at 717. 
   232.   First Amended Class Action Complaint, Exhibit D, at 2, Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942 
(“Investment Advisor and investment strategy must be on either the MAC Researched 
Advisor List or the Reviewed Advisor List.”); Pl’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. 
to Dismiss First Am. Class Action Compl., at 2, Hsu, 2011 WL 7562118 (“Defendant’s 
gloss that Plaintiff ‘had freedom to choose his Investment Manager’ . . . is inconsistent with 
the FAC, which makes clear (through Defendant’s own documents) that Plaintiff’s selection 
of an investment manager is wholly circumscribed by Defendant’s recommendations from a 
pre-determined list of managers.”) (emphasis original). 
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complaint. 
On paper, the Hsu plaintiff’s case seemed solid under the principles 
elucidated in Heitman Capital: the plaintiff was not an institutional 
investor, and there were no facts suggesting that he was a sophisticated 
person, that he had any bargaining power to negotiate with UBS over the 
hedge clause, or that the hedge clause was ever explained to him by UBS or 
any intermediary.  But the Hsu opinions reflect the practical difficulty that 
plaintiffs may have in stating claims under the IAA for deceptive practices 
based on hedge clauses.  In the section of its decision summarizing the 
parties’ respective arguments, the district court noted, in a manner 
suggesting skepticism, that the plaintiff was seeking rescission of “all of 
UBS’s contracts for this particular ‘wrap’ fee program.”
233
  Although the 
district court never gave grounds for its skepticism, perhaps it grew out of 
several facts, some of which UBS pointed out in its motion to dismiss or on 
appeal: the plaintiff utilized Horizon as his investment manager for 
approximately two-and-one half years in the program; the plaintiff never 
exercising his apparent right to switch his investment manager at any 
time;
234
 and the plaintiff never alleged that “he was ever actually misled” 
by the hedge clause, or anything else, into believing that he was actually 
unable to sue UBS for Horizon’s conduct.
235
 
Heitman Capital clarified that disclaimers for a variety of conduct 
such as mere negligence are potentially permissible if the advisee is 
sufficiently sophisticated and possesses bargaining power, or is represented 
by a financial intermediary with these qualities.  Without regard to the 
identity of the advisee or the financial intermediary, Hsu allowed a hedge 
clause disclaiming an adviser’s liability for the acts of an investment 
manager recommended by the investment adviser, even though that 
recommendation in itself constitutes investment advice. 
Further developments in this area will have to await further litigation 
or SEC enforcement actions.  But, as the courts have proven to be 
inhospitable venues for complaints about hedge clauses, we may be waiting 
for quite some time. 
D. Restrictions on Assignments 
Both the IAA and the ICA contain restrictions on assignments of an 
investment advisory contract by an investment adviser.  The IAA is more 
 
 233.  Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942, at *2 (emphasis in original). 
 234.  Defendant UBS Financial Services, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion to 
Dismiss; Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support Thereof at 9, No. 3:11-cv-02076-
WHA, 2011 WL 7562119 (N.D. Cal. filed June 3, 2011).  
 235.  Id. 
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permissive as it allows, in subsection 205(a)(2), such an assignment with 
“the consent of the other party to the contract.”
236
  This requirement for 
consent did not apply to an advisory contract with an investment company 
in the original 1940 version of the IAA.
237
  The 1970 amendments 
preserved this exemption from the consent requirement for an assignment 
of an investment advisory contract with an investment company, although 
it was limited to investment advisory contracts with registered investment 
companies.
238
 
Although the legislative history provides no reason for why subsection 
205(a)(2) does not address assignments of investment adviser contracts 
with registered investment companies, it seems likely that this exemption in 
the IAA is meant to ensure that the more restrictive assignment provisions 
of the ICA cannot be evaded.  In subsection 15(a)(4), the ICA provides that 
any investment advisory contract with a registered investment company 
must “provide[], in substance, for its automatic termination in the event of 
its assignment.”
239
  Once an assignment has occurred, any new contract 
between an investment adviser and a registered investment company must 
be approved by both the shareholders of the investment company
240
 and the 
members of the board of directors of the investment company who are 
independent of the investment adviser.
241
 
IV. LIMITED SEC RESOURCES HAVE LED TO INADEQUATE 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
To the extent that there are either explicit restrictions on investment 
advisers under the IAA or implicit restrictions arising from their position as 
fiduciaries for their advisees under the IAA, the effectiveness of these 
restrictions rests on enforcement by the SEC.  As described in Part V.B. of 
this Article, the Supreme Court in Transamerica spoke very clearly on this 
 
 236.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2) (2006).  Subsection 205(a)(3) provides that an investment 
adviser that is organized as a partnership must “notify the other party to the contract of any 
change in the membership of such partnership within a reasonable time after such change.”  
Id. § 80b-5(a)(3). 
 237.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 768, § 205, 54 Stat. 789, 852 (“As 
used in this section, ‘investment advisory contract’ means any contract or agreement 
whereby a person agrees to act as investment adviser or to manage any investment or 
trading account for a person other than an investment company.”) (emphasis added). 
 238.  Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 25, 84 Stat. 
1413, 1432–33 (1970).  In 1987, section 205 was subdivided into the current structure and 
the fourth sentence of section 205 became subsection 205(d).  Pub. L. 100-181, § 205, 101 
Stat. 1249, 1263–64 (1987). 
 239.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (2006). 
 240.  Id. § 80a-15(a). 
 241.  Id. § 80a-15(c). 
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issue, holding that the only private cause of action under the IAA is one for 
rescission under section 215(b).
242
  Later cases have not attempted to find a 
way around this restriction. 
The SEC has historically been unable to properly regulate investment 
advisers due to a lack of resources and the sheer number of investment 
advisers.
243
  This lack of effective oversight led Congress in the Dodd-
Frank Act to direct the SEC to prepare a report on the oversight of 
investment advisers.
244
 
This Article does not intend to take a position on the debate about the 
proper means to regulate investment advisers.  But it does intend to point 
out that we are in the worst possible position.  Currently, there is no 
effective regulatory oversight and there is no effective private legal 
recourse for advisees if there is a breach of an investment adviser’s 
duties.
245
  Suggestions on how to remedy this problem have included a self-
regulatory organization (“SRO”) for investment advisers, more resources 
for the SEC, increased state regulation of investment advisers, and 
legislation creating a private cause of action for advisees under the IAA.
246
  
Reading the history of these debates is a bit like reading about the Battle of 
Verdun.  The same set of arguments have gone over the top and been shot 
down several different times over the past fifty years.  The only major 
suggestion that has been adopted is the regulation of smaller investment 
advisers by state, rather than SEC, regulation.
247
  The ground is indeed 
muddy and full of shell holes and dead bodies. 
Concerns about the SEC’s practical ability to properly regulate 
investment advisers have been raised regularly over the past fifty years.  In 
its 1963 Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, the SEC 
advocated for a self-regulatory organization of investment advisers or, if 
this was impossible, “added cost of governmental supervision should be 
passed on and directly borne by those in the industry who are not members 
 
 242.  Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). 
 243.  Elisse B. Walter, Chairperson, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Study 
Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations, 1–2 (Jan. 2011), transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch011911ebw.pdf. 
 244.  2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers & Broker-Dealers, supra note 9. 
 245.  Id. at 44. 
 246.  GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), CURRENT LEVEL OF OVERSIGHT PUTS INVESTORS 
AT RISK 27, GAO/GGD-90-83 Investment Advisers (1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
150/149341.pdf [hereinafter GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS]. 
 247.  See SEC & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. AND ADVOCACY, INVESTOR 
BULLETIN: TRANSITION OF MID-SIZED INVESTMENT ADVISERS FROM FEDERAL TO STATE 
REGISTRATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/transition-of-mid-
sized-investment-advisers.pdf (advising that state securities authorities would have primary 
regulatory authority over many investment advisers that were previously subject to primary 
regulation by the SEC). 
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of such a [self-regulatory] body, through fees or other assessments.”
248
  
Much of the SEC’s concern in 1963 was focused on the lack of 
qualification standards for investment advisers,
249
 rather than on the more 
current concern about compliance with general fiduciary duties and 
regulatory obligations.  But the general point remains that there was a 
concern that investment advisers were not being properly regulated. 
When Transamerica was being briefed in 1979, the SEC submitted an 
amicus brief that argued in favor of private causes of action, noting that 
“[t]he Commission’s examination and enforcement capabilities have not 
grown proportionately” with the number of investment managers and the 
assets under management.
250
  “In the fiscal year that ended September 30, 
1977, 4,823 persons were registered with the Commission as investment 
advisers.”
251
  In that year, the SEC “conduct[ed] only 459 inspections of 
investment advisers.”
252
  The dissent in Transamerica relied upon these 
facts to argue that “[w]hile the Act empowers the SEC to take action to 
seek equitable relief to prevent offending investment advisers from 
engaging in future violations, in the absence of a private right of action for 
damages, victimized clients have little hope of obtaining redress for their 
injuries.”
253
 
In 1990, the GAO produced a report that concluded that, “[i]f the 
oversight  program [for investment advisers] is not improved, the 1940 Act 
may be doing more harm than good by giving investors the illusion that 
SEC-registered advisers have a ‘seal of approval.’”
254
  Although the GAO 
identified some measures that the SEC could take without significant new 
resources, such as creating a central database of information about 
inspections of investment advisers, it did explicitly identify the SEC’s lack 
 
 248.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 1, at 159 (1963). 
 249.  Id. at 158 (“Neither the Federal Government nor any self-regulatory body exercises 
any controls over the competence of these persons for the performance of their advisory 
work. . . . Furthermore, the proprietors of registered investment advisers who confine their 
activities to the giving of investment advice need not pass any examination at all, except in a 
few States, even though they may be responsible for advising individual clients or 
subscribers to their publications to engage in particular securities transactions.”). 
 250.  Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 33, Transamerica 
Mortg. Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (No. 77-1645). 
 251.  Id. at 32. 
 252.  Id. at 33. 
 253. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34–35 (1979) (White, J., 
dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing Brief for the SEC, supra note 250, at 32–33) 
(“Moreover, the SEC candidly admits that, given the tremendous growth of the investment 
advisory industry, the magnitude of the enforcement problem exceeds the Commission’s 
limited examination and enforcement capabilities.”). 
 254.  GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 246, at 3. 
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of resources as an important problem.
255
  The most startling of GAO’s 
discussions of the SEC’s lack of resources is the comparison between the 
number of investment advisers and the total amount of assets under 
management to the number of field examiners who did investment adviser 
inspections.
256
  The GAO reported that, since 1980, “the number of 
[registered investment] advisers has tripled from about 4,600 to about 
14,000, and the assets they manage have increased 10-fold . . . to about 
$4.6 trillion.”
257
  In contrast, the number of field examiners had not 
changed from 1980:  it continued during this period to be approximately 
forty-one.
258
 
The GAO reported that newly-registered investment advisers were, on 
average, not inspected for three years after their registration and that many 
investment advisers had never been inspected.
259
  The SEC, in its comment 
letter to the GAO on the initial version of the report, stated that “the 
frequency with which advisers are inspected declined steadily from about 
once every 7.5 years in 1983 to once every 12.5 years in 1990 . . . .”
260
  The 
lack of resources impacted not only inspections but also the initial 
registration and amendments to registrations.
261
  For example, the SEC did 
not have the resources to verify that the information reported by a 
registering investment adviser was accurate.
262
  The SEC in its comment 
letter reported that two to three thousand new advisers were registering 
each year.
263
  And the GAO reported that there were over 10,000 
amendments to prior registrations in fiscal year 1988.
264
 
The GAO considered four different proposals to deal with the 
inadequacy of the regulatory regime:  creating an SRO; increasing funding 
for the SEC, requiring that small investment advisers register within their 
state; and Congress’ creating a private cause of action under the IAA.
265
  
The story of these proposals is a story of failure.  None of these proposals, 
other than state regulation, have come to fruition, although it does appear 
that an SRO might be created through Congressional action.
266
  As state 
 
 255.  Id. at 27 (“The numbers of SEC-registered investment advisers are growing faster 
than the resources available to regulate them.”); id. at 28 (“Lacking adequate staff to 
effectively regulate the industry . . . .”). 
 256.  Id. at 2. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. at 10. 
 259.  Id. at 19. 
 260.  Id. at 47. 
 261.  Id. at 4, 17, 19. 
 262.  Id. at 16. 
 263.  Id. at 41. 
 264.  Id. at 18. 
 265.  Id. at 27. 
 266.  See Melanie Waddell, As Congress Keeps SEC Budget Flat, SRO Specter Still 
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regulation of smaller investment advisers has been the preferred solution to 
the problems of the SEC’s resources since 1995, it is discussed first in this 
Article.  A private cause of action, the subject of at least two legislative 
pushes in Congress, is discussed second. 
It is worth noting that the exact parameters of the current resource 
problem are unclear.  We do not have figures about the number of Office of 
Compliance Inspections and Examinations (the “OCIE”) staff
267
 who are 
currently devoted primarily to examining investment advisers.  We do have 
these figures for 1992.  At the end of fiscal year 2010, there were 460 staff 
members who examined both registered investment advisers and 
investment companies.
268
  In 1992, each field inspector completed 
approximately twenty-five inspections of registered investment advisers 
each year.
269
  This rate was considerably higher than the rate in the early 
1980s.
270
  Today, on average, an OCIE inspector completes less than three 
examinations per year of investment advisers, although this figure does not 
include examinations of investment companies.
271
  In addition, the SEC is 
sensitive to the issue of examining investment advisers who have newly 
registered pursuant to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.
272
  OCIE’s 
goal is to examine all such newly-registered investment advisers within a 
 
Lurks, ADVISORONE (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2012/09/24/as-
congress-keeps-sec-budget-flat-sro-specter-stil (suggesting that failure to increase the SEC’s 
budget might lead to the introduction of a bill calling for the creation of an SRO). 
 267.  OCIE administers the SEC’s examination and inspection program by conducting 
examinations of registered entities, including: broker-dealers, transfer agents, investment 
advisers, investment companies, the national securities exchanges, clearing agencies, SROs 
like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board, and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  National Exam 
Program: Offices and Program Areas, SEC.GOV (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ocie/ 
Article/about.html#.VIPGUmRdXlM (“OCIE’s mission is to protect investors, ensure 
market integrity and support responsible capital formation through risk-focused strategies 
that: (1) improve compliance; (2) prevent fraud; (3) monitor risk; and (4) inform policy.”). 
 268.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER 
EXAMINATIONS 11 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf 
[hereinafter 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations]. 
 269.  GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 246, at 25. 
 270.  Id. at 47 (“[T]he inspection staff increased its productivity by over 100% between 
1981 and 1985 in terms of the number of inspections done annually per examiner . . . .”). 
 271.  2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 11, 14.  The total 
number of examiners in chart 3 is 460, while the total number of examinations of investment 
advisers in chart 6 is 1,083. Id. Dividing 1,083 by 460 yields 2.35 examinations per 
examiner.  This calculation was suggested by David Tittsworth.  To get to 25 examinations 
per examiner, the 1992 figure, there would have to be only forty-three examiners devoted to 
investment adviser examinations, with the rest of the 460 examiners’ time devoted to 
investment companies. 
 272.  Id. at 19. 
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two-year period starting in October 2012.
273
 
A. State Regulation of Smaller Investment Advisers 
Prior to 1996, all investment advisers were subject to registration both 
with the SEC and the states.
274
  In the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 (the “NSMIA”), Congress moved investment 
advisers with less than $25 million in assets under management from SEC 
to state regulation.
275
  Nothing had changed since the 1990 GAO report.  If 
anything, the SEC was spread even more thinly.  Investment advisers who 
had discretion over client assets were inspected about once every nine 
years, while the average adviser was not inspected more than once every 
twenty-two years.
276
 
Congress was concerned that both the SEC and the state regulators 
were overwhelmed with the burden of regulating more than 22,000 
registered investment advisers.
277
  The goal was to split the burden between 
the SEC and the state regulatory authorities, allowing for more effective 
regulation of all investment advisers.
278
 
In 2010, Congress once again reallocated responsibility between the 
SEC and state regulators to make for more effective regulation of 
investment advisers.  In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created a new 
category of “mid-sized” investment advisers; those with assets under 
 
 273.  Letter from Drew Bowden, SEC Deputy Dir. of OCIE, to the Senior Executives or 
Principals of a Newly Registered Investment Advisor (Oct. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/letter-presence-exams.pdf. 
 274.  See Howard M. Friedman, The Impact of NSMIA on State Regulation of Broker-
Dealers and Investment Advisers, 53 BUS. LAW. 511, 531 (1998) (discussing the reallocation 
of registration authority under federal law). 
 275.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (restricting federal regulation of 
investment advisers). 
 276.  See SEC’s New Approach to Examinations of Advisers Focuses on Risk to Clients, 
27 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 1704 (Oct. 27, 1995) (discussing the SEC’s 
examination practices for investment advisers). 
 277.  See S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 2 (1996) (stating that regulation by both the SEC and 
states is unnecessary). 
 278.  Id. at 2–3 (“Title I of the bill creates a clear division of labor between the states and 
the federal government for supervision of investment advisers.  Currently, while investment 
advisers are nominally supervised by the SEC and by most states, both are overwhelmed by 
the size of the task, with more than 22,000 investment advisers currently registered with the 
SEC.  The reality has been that while investment advisers may boast of their registration 
with the SEC, the SEC has been unable to conduct active supervision of more than a 
fraction of the advisers registered with the Commission.  State securities commissioners 
have similarly found their resources spread thin.  Title I would improve supervision by 
focusing SEC supervision on investment advisers most likely to be engaged in interstate 
commerce and focusing state supervision on advisers whose activities are most likely to be 
centered in their home state.”) (footnote omitted). 
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management of $25 million or more but less than $100 million were now 
regulated by the states.
279
  Putting aside the marvelous Rube Goldberg 
drafting that led to two different provisions for state registration when one 
would have done, and the incredibly scant legislative history,
280
 “[t]he 
apparent purpose of this reallocation was to allow the SEC to focus its 
examination resources on larger investment advisers.”
281
  In 2010, the SEC 
estimated that approximately 4,100 advisers would switch from SEC to 
state registration.
282
  In addition, the SEC estimated that 750 investment 
advisers would lose their exemptions from registration under the IAA
283
 
because Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act provided that investment advisers 
with fewer than fifteen clients were no longer exempt from registration.
284
  
This swept in many investment advisers to hedge funds, defined in Dodd-
Frank as “private equity fund[s].”
285
 
 
 279.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (describing the regulatory oversight of mid-sized 
investment advisers). 
 280.  See generally H.R. REP. NO. 111-517 (2010) (Conf. Rep.) (listing the provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank amendments).  The sole Congressional report on the Dodd-Frank Act 
contains only fifteen pages devoted to a Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of 
Conference, compared to 865 pages of the report devoted to reprinting the act itself.  Id. at 
865–880.  There is no explanation for why investment advisers with assets under 
management of up to $100 million should be under state regulation.  There is only a one-
sentence description of this change with no explanation of the purpose behind the change: 
“The conference report raises the assets threshold for federal regulation of investment 
advisers from $30 million to $100 million.”  Id. at 867.  There is nothing in the 
congressional record that sheds any additional light on the congressional intent behind the 
new “mid-sized” investment adviser provision. 
 281.  Davis Polk Client Memorandum, SEC Issues Final Rules Implementing Dodd-
Frank Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, at 11 (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/4c1a63de-64be-4051-a955-
00faeaf7fe53/Preview/PublicationAttachment/0c0cb405-27c8-451d-abaf-06c40e076bc0/ 
062911_Investment_Advisers_Dodd_Frank_Final_Rules.pdf. 
 282.  2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 16 n.31. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Congress did provide a new exemption for a “foreign private adviser” that meets 
certain criteria, including having “fewer than 15 clients and investors in the United States in 
private funds advised by the investment adviser.”  15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30)(B) (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2010).  In addition, section 2(a)(30) provides that a foreign adviser is only 
“private” and thus exempt if it has no domestic office, has less than $25 million in domestic 
assets under management, does not hold itself out as an investment advisor, and does not 
advise a registered investment company.  Id. at § 80b-2(a)(30). 
 285.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining private equity 
funds).  By eliminating the exemption from registration for investment advisers to fewer 
than 15 clients, many formally exempt investment advisers were threatened with registration 
under the IAA.  In response to concerns about such increased registration, Congress, in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, exemped investment advisers of certain types of private funds from 
registration, notably venture capital funds and private funds with less than $150 million in 
assets under management in the United States, though private funds still have reporting 
requirements.  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act added an adviser to a “family office” as a 
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In fact, more investment advisers that lost their exemption became 
SEC registered and fewer mid-sized advisers switched to state regulation.
286
  
As of October 19, 2012, 1,504 investment advisers, hedge funds, and other 
private funds that were formerly exempt from registration had registered 
with the SEC, and more than 2,300 mid-sized investment advisers had 
switched to state regulation.
287
  The net effect of these changes is that the 
number of SEC registered investment advisers dropped from 12,622 to 
approximately 10,700.
288
  Meanwhile, the assets under management of SEC 
registered investment advisers increased from approximately $48.73 trillion 
 
type of entity that was not an “investment adviser,” as such term is used in the IAA. See 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining an investment adviser).  Family 
offices are largely those established by wealthy families to manage the assets of, and 
provide other services to, its own family members.  To be exempt as an adviser to a family 
office, the investment adviser is not permitted to have any investment advisory clients other 
than “family clients.” 
 286.  See Davis Polk Client Memorandum, supra note 281, at 1 (discussing the 
implications of the Dodd-Frank Amendments). 
 287.  See SEC Press Release, supra note 102 (discussing SEC registration trends since 
Dodd-Frank).  An additional 293 investment advisers were identified by the SEC either as 
having gone out of business or as having failed to switch to state registration.  Id.  (citing 
Notice of Intention to Cancel Registrations of Certain Investment Advisers Pursuant to 
Section 203(h) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).  More investment advisers would 
have switched to state registration if the numerous New York State investment advisers 
were eligible for SEC registrations.  See INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., 
EVOLUTION REVOLUTION 2010: A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISOR PROFESSION 20 
(2011), available at http://www.nrs-inc.com/Global/White%20Papers/NRSEvolution 
Revolution_2011_WhitePaper_Screen_final.pdf [hereinafter EVOLUTION REVOLUTION 2010] 
(noting the 1,552 SEC registered investment advisers located in New York State in 2010).  
The Dodd-Frank Act amended section 203A of the IAA to provide that mid-sized 
investment advisers cannot register with the SEC if the adviser “is required to be registered 
as an investment adviser with the securities commissioner (or any agency or office 
performing like functions) of the State in which it maintains its principal office and place of 
business and, if registered, would be subject to examination as an investment adviser by any 
such commissioner, agency, or office.”  H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 205–06.  The Dodd-
Frank Act did not define what it means to be “required to be registered” or to be “subject to 
examination.”  See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,960 (June 22, 2011) (discussing the SEC’s adoption of 
amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).  The SEC provides guidance on 
what states do not meet its requirements through a website that is referenced in Form ADV, 
the registration form for both state and SEC registered investment advisers.  See Form ADV 
(Paper Version), at Part 1A Item 2.A.(2), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/ 
formadv-part1a.pdf (describing the registration process for investment advisers).  New York 
and Wyoming are the two states that fail to meet these requirements.  Frequently Asked 
Questions Regarding Mid-Sized Advisers, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
investment/midsizedadviserinfo.htm (last updated Jun. 28, 2011). 
   288.    See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DODD-FRANK ACT CHANGES TO INVESTMENT ADVISER 
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS, 5 fig. 7 (2012), http://sec.gov/divisions/investment/imissues/ 
df-iaregistration.pdf (noting the impact of Dodd-Frank on investment adviser registration). 
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to $49.50 trillion.
289
 
It is frustrating that the legislative history is so opaque on the new 
“mid-sized” investment adviser provision.  But it is hard to imagine 
anything motivating this provision other than Congress’ decision that 
scarce SEC resources were best used to examine the larger investment 
advisers rather than the smaller investment advisers.
290
  When the Dodd-
Frank Act was passed, there was publicly-available evidence that the SEC, 
as it had in the past, was overstretched and failed to examine investment 
advisers with regularity.
291
  In addition, two witnesses at the 2009 Senate 
hearing on Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities 
 
   289.     Id. 
 290.  See generally DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2-9 (2009), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (noting how the 
financial regulatory infrastructure mighty be improved).  The 2009 report prepared by the 
Department of the Treasury highlights the need for many statutory changes that were 
embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act.  Id.  There is, however, nothing in the report about 
moving mid-sized investment advisers to state regulation.   
 291.  See, e.g., INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., 2009 EVOLUTION 
REVOLUTION — A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER PROFESSION 2 (2009) (“Our 
previous reports . . . have chronicled the growth in the number of investment advisor 
registrations since 2001.  A key question in the current regulatory reform debate is whether 
the SEC’s resources are adequate to provide effective oversight of the advisory 
profession.”); SEC, PUTTING INVESTORS FIRST: 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 18–30 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf (discussing the 
SEC’s regulatory performance).  As the SEC noted,  
[i]n recent years, the number of registered advisers has increased by nearly 50 
percent and the assets under management by these advisers have nearly 
doubled . . . . While OCIE staff has not increased proportionally, OCIE 
continues to target high-risk firms and activities as resources permit.  During the 
past year, OCIE examined the operations, or some portion thereof, of nearly 10 
percent of all registered advisers and 30 percent of all registered fund 
complexes.   
Id. at 18.  The SEC did not meet its 2009 target for examinations of “high risk” investment 
advisers.  Id. at 30.  Only 22 percent were examined, whereas the target had been 35 
percent.  Id.  The SEC explained this failure by noting the OCIE had adopted “improved 
risk-based processes” for identifying high risk firms, which increased the number of such 
firms identified.  Id.  “In addition, OCIE introduced more rigorous exam procedures, 
improved its surveillance techniques, and enhanced staff training.”  Id.  The combination of 
these factors led to an increase in “the time it took to complete examinations and [a drop in] 
the overall number of examinations completed.”  Id.  The SEC was more successful in 
responding to no-action and interpretive requests and exemptive order requests from the 
investment management industry.  In the year ending on September 30, 2009, the Division 
of Investment Management “[p]rovide[d] initial comments on . . . [100%] percent of 
interpretive and no-action requests within three weeks of receipt of the letter request” and 
“[p]rovide[d] initial comments on. . . [95] percent of exemptive applications within 120 days 
after receipt of an application.”  Id. at 44–45.  Both figures considerably exceeded the 
targets of 75 and 80 percent, respectively.  Id. at 44. 
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Markets testified in favor of some type of mid-sized investment adviser 
exemption from SEC registration.
292
  Senator Dodd explicitly referenced 
this possible exemption in one of his comments.
293
  It is impossible to state 
with certainty whether Congress took into account evidence of this type 
when considering the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly in section 203A.
294
 
The clearest evidence of this overstretch is the report that the SEC 
prepared on enhancing examinations of investment advisers pursuant to 
Section 914 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Section 914 Report”).
295
  The 
report does not shed direct light on the legislative purpose behind the 
amendments to section 203A, as it was issued subsequent to the passage of 
the Dodd-Frank Act but, it is an eloquent plea for the need for more 
resources to be devoted to regulating investment advisers.  As the SEC 
itself concluded, “[a]s the number of registered investment advisers and the 
assets managed by them have increased and the number of OCIE staff 
dedicated to examining registered investment advisers has decreased over 
the past six years, the number of examinations of registered investment 
advisers has decreased.”
296
  In 2004, the typical investment adviser was 
examined about once every six years.
297
  By 2010, this had become about 
once every eleven years.
298
  Comparable examination period figures are not 
available for fiscal year 2011, but the SEC has reported a target of eleven 
percent for all types of examinations of investment advisers.  The SEC 
 
 292.  Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets—Part II: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 86 
(2009) (statement of Fred J. Joseph, President, N. Am. Secs. Adm’rs Ass’n) (“[T]his 
increase [from $25 to $100 million] will reduce the number of federally registered 
investment advisors, thereby permitting the SEC to better focus its examination and 
enforcement resources on the largest advisors.”); Id. at 217–18 (statement of David G. 
Tittsworth, Exec. Dir. & Exec. Vice President, Inv. Advisers Ass’n) (“An increase in the 
threshold would reduce the number of SEC-registered advisers and permit the SEC to focus 
on the appropriate universe of advisers on a risk-adjusted basis in its examination 
program.”). 
 293.  Former Senator Christopher J. Dodd, chairman of the committee, noted, after the 
Statement by Fred J. Joseph, President, North American Securities Administrators 
Association, that “I think we all have some questions about various proposals and raising 
from 25 to 100 million and so forth, what that involves.” Id. at 32. 
 294.  The SEC is of the view that this was the congressional intent.  “Congress twice has 
responded to capacity challenges to the Commission’s investment adviser examination 
program by reallocating federal and state responsibilities for the regulation of registered 
investment advisers, first in 1966 with the enactment of NSMIA and next in 2010 with the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.”  2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra 
note 268, at 23. 
 295.  See id. (noting the personnel challenges presented by the expected increase in 
registered investment advisers). 
 296.  Id. at 14. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
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actually examined only eight percent.
299
 
Although the SEC will be able to devote more resources to SEC 
registered investment advisers, the SEC has new examination 
responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank Act and it is concerned that the 
number of SEC-registered investment advisers will start to grow again, as it 
did after the NSMIA.
300
  The SEC attempted to solve the problems 
associated with insufficient resources in the Section 914 Report by 
considering all of the traditional solutions:  an SRO for investment 
advisers, including the more limited version of having FINRA take 
responsibility for examining its members that were dually registered as 
investment advisers and broker-dealers in their capacity as investment 
advisers, and a type of self-funding relying upon user fees to give the SEC 
additional financial resources.
301
  The SEC did reject “periodic reallocation 
of investment adviser regulatory responsibilities” to the states as a solution 
because it was concerned about the resources that states could or would 
devote to these responsibilities.
302
 
The SEC’s concerns about reallocations to state registration are well 
taken.  Prior to the switch of mid-size investment advisers to state 
regulations mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act, there was “one full-time 
licensing/exam [state] staff member for approximately every 37 state–
registered [i]nvestment advisers.”
303
  In contrast, prior to the switch, the 
SEC had approximately one SEC OCIE staff member for every 26 
investment advisers.
304
  The differences in regulatory functions can give 
 
 299.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 59 
(2011), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf.  But it is hard to make this 
argument because we do not know whether the eight percent includes repeat examinations 
of particular investment advisers.  The published figures also show a decline from fiscal 
year 2007 to fiscal year 2009 in some examinations from 33% of high-risk investment 
advisers to 22%.  Id. 
 300.  See 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 25 
(addressing options to consider when facing capacity constraints). 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Id. at 24. 
 303.  N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (“NASAA”), STATE SECURITIES REGULATORS REPORT 
ON REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS AND RESOURCES WITH RESPECT TO BROKER-DEALS AND 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS 12 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-
2789.pdf [hereinafter NASAA Report].  The number of investment advisers per state staff 
member will have increased with the state registration of mid-sized advisers.  One important 
qualification is that this is an average figure covering all states, (except New York) Puerto 
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.  The easily available public 
information does not break out this figure by jurisdiction.  There is a Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning the Examination of Investment Advisers whereby a state that has 
elected to participate may request the help of investment adviser examiners from other 
participant states.  Id. at 4.  
 304.  See  2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 12 (charting 
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some comfort that state regulators are not as under-resourced as they 
appear.  The OCIE staff examines registered investment companies as well 
as SEC-registered investment advisers.
305
  The states examine broker-
dealers and investment adviser representatives in addition to state-
registered investment advisers.
306
  With respect to broker-dealers, states 
have relied on FINRA and the SEC as the front-line regulators, focusing 
more on risk-based exams and exams of small, geographically remote 
offices that might be harder to reach for the SEC’s regional offices and 
FINRA.
307
  In addition, the states have conducted routine examinations of 
the state-registered investment advisers “with much greater frequency than 
the [SEC] has historically examined” SEC-registered investment 
advisers.
308
 
B. Private Causes of Action Under the IAA 
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, the Supreme Court restricted 
private causes of action under the IAA to certain equitable remedies under 
section 215 if a contract with an investment adviser is “void.”
309
  
Specifically, a plaintiff can seek to rescind such a contract and “obtain 
restitution of consideration paid” to the offending investment adviser.
310
  
Although such restitution “could provide by indirection the equivalent of a 
private damages remedy that we have concluded Congress did not confer,” 
it “would not . . . include [any] compensation for any diminution in the 
value of the rescinding party’s investment alleged to have resulted from the 
 
the number of OCIE staff who monitor registered investment advisers and investment 
companies from 2004 to 2010). 
 305.  Id. at 5. 
 306.  See 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers & Broker-Dealers, supra note 9, at 84 
(summarizing state regulation of investment-advisers and broker dealers). 
 307.  See NASAA Report, supra note 303, at 10 (discussing NASAA’s regulatory 
strategy). 
 308.  Id. at 8.  Their conclusion should be taken with a bit of skepticism as it is based on 
goals for reporting cycles and there is no easily available public information that compares 
goals with achievements of these goals. 
 309.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (2006) (“Every contract made in violation of any provision 
of this subchapter and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of 
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in 
violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, 
shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision, 
rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such 
contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract, 
shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of 
which the making or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision.”). 
 310.  Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979). 
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adviser’s action or inaction.”
311
 
The Supreme Court has not made a similar blanket holding under the 
ICA concerning private causes of action and, in fact, has recognized them 
under two sections of the ICA, section 36(b)
312
 and section 30(h).
313
  In 
addition, in the context of derivative actions brought by shareholders on 
behalf of their investment companies, the Supreme Court has twice 
assumed, without deciding, that a derivative action may be brought under 
certain sections of the ICA.
314
  Having said all of this, the recent trend of 
lower federal court decisions has been against implying private causes of 
action by shareholders of investment companies where the ICA does not 
expressly provide for a private cause of action.  Only sections 36(b) and 
30(h) provide for a private cause of action, although cases remain that 
would support implying a private cause of action and have not been 
explicitly overruled or limited.
315
 
Congress has been no more receptive than the courts to a private cause 
of action under the IAA or the ICA.  Looking specifically at the IAA, 
 
 311.  Id. at 24 n.14. 
 312.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).  For a discussion of section 
36(b), see infra notes 312-315 and accompanying text. 
 313.  Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 20 n.10 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1970)) 
(“Investment advisor[s] . . . shall . . . be subject to the same duties and liabilities as those 
imposed by [section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] upon certain beneficial 
owners, directors, and officers in respect of their transactions in certain equity securities.”). 
 314.  Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 n.4 (1991) (“Because the 
question whether § 20(a) supports a derivative action is not jurisdictional, and because we 
do not ordinarily address issues raised only by amici [such as the SEC in this case], we leave 
this question for another day.”  (citations omitted)); Burks v. Lasker, 90 S. Ct. 1831, 1836 
(“As petitioners never disputed the existence of private, derivative causes of action under 
the [ICA and IAA], and as in this Court all agree that the question has not been put in issue, 
we shall assume without deciding that respondents have implied, derivative causes of action 
under [sections 13(a)(3) and 36(a) of] the ICA and [section 206 of the] IAA.”  (citations and 
footnote omitted)). 
 315.  Compare Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 615 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that no private cause of action exists under ICA section 13(a)), Bellikoff 
v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that no private cause of 
action exists under ICA sections 34(b), 36(a) and 48(a)) and Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. 
of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that no private cause of action exists 
under ICA sections 26(f) and 27(i)), with Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 
136 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of shareholders’ derivative action brought, in 
part, under ICA section 36(a) on grounds that demand was not excused without mentioning 
private cause of action issue or citing to Olmsted); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 112 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (“[T]here is no reason to conclude that, by adopting [in section 36(b)] a modified 
version of the SEC’s proposal to afford an express private remedy with respect to one 
problem as to which the 1940 Act had proved ineffective, the 1970 Congress meant to 
withdraw the implied private cause of action in other areas which had been recognized over 
the previous decade by four courts of appeals . . . .”). 
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starting in 1976,
316
 there have been a number of SEC proposals and 
Congressional bills providing for some type of private cause of action 
under the IAA, all of which have failed.
317
  There is nothing in our current 
political climate that would lead one to expect Congress to now be more 
receptive to creating private causes of action under either the IAA or the 
ICA. 
C. Self-Regulatory Organization 
One solution proposed for the problems of SEC oversight of 
investment advisers is a self-regulatory organization of investment 
advisers.  This was one of the three proposals in the report that the SEC 
issued pursuant to section 914 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  This is not a new 
proposal.  It has been a topic of discussion since at least 1963 and, over the 
years, Congress has considered several bills providing the SEC with the 
authority to create such a self-regulatory organization.
318
  The SEC’s 
Section 914 Report summarizes the history: “The concept of an SRO for 
investment advisers is not new.  Proposals to create one or more SROs for 
investment advisers have been considered by Congress, the Commission 
and members of the investment advisory industry for over 45 years.”
319
 
The recent consideration of a self-regulatory organization for 
investment advisers has been quite controversial, attracting fierce 
opposition from certain members of the investment adviser industry.
320
  
Opponents have argued that such a self-regulatory organization would 
suffer from a variety of defects.  Among the concerns have been (1) the 
possibility that a self-regulatory organization might not be subject to the 
 
 316.  Kevin F. Brady & Mark Rockwell, Note, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and 
the Supreme Court: Private Rights of Action Under the New Cort Test, 6 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 
54, 61 (1981). 
 317.  See id. at 62 (describing how 1976 proposed amendment was reintroduced in 
1977); GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 246, at 33-34 (describing 1990 bill to 
amend the IAA to add a private cause of action).  As one article summarized, the changes 
made in the 1960s and 1970s to the IAA to cover more than a census of investment advisers, 
“Congress has now had five opportunities to rectify the confusion concerning private rights 
of action [under the IAA].  Congress has apparently chosen not to act on the situation.”  
Brady & Rockwell, supra note 316, at 62. 
 318.  2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 29-30 n.54. 
 319.  Id. at 29. 
 320.  See, e.g., David G. Tittsworth, H.R. 4624: The Pitfalls of a Self-Regulatory 
Organization for Investment Advisers and Why User Fees Would Better Accomplish the 
Goal of Investment Adviser Accountability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 477 (2013) (critiquing a 
bill mandating investment adviser membership in a SRO).  Tittsworth is the Executive 
Director and Executive Vice President of the Investment Adviser Association, the largest 
trade organization representing investment advisers. Id. at 477 n.d1 
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Administrative Procedure Act or the Freedom of Information Act;
321
 (2) 
increased costs that investment advisers would bear because of a second 
regulatory agency besides the SEC overseeing their activities;
322
 and (3) 
increased costs that might be incurred by the SEC for overseeing such a 
self-regulatory organization.
323
 
There has been particular opposition to FINRA’s assuming of the role 
of self-regulator for investment advisers.
324
  This opposition arises in large 
part from the fact that FINRA historically is an organization of broker-
dealers, which have different business models from many investment 
advisers.
325
  In addition, opponents view FINRA as an organization that is 
not accountable in any meaningful way to the public, the SEC, or its 
members.
326
 
The Cato Institute summarized one view of FINRA when it wrote, in a 
recent amicus brief, that “FINRA’s extra-constitutional operation has 
fostered significant policy failures including agency capture, lax regulation, 
and biased arbitration. . . . The proliferation of substantial financial industry 
scandals over the past decade is evidence that FINRA is, at best, a hands-
off regulator and, at worst, a corrupt and self-serving company.”
327
 
D. Increased Funding for the SEC 
One can always dream.  Self-funding for the SEC either of a general 
kind or of a more limited kind, as in user fees charged to investment 
advisers, has been proposed numerous times.
328
  The political likelihood of 
 
 321.  Id. at 499. 
 322.  Id. at 504. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. at 496–99. 
 325.  Id. at 497 (“Broker-dealers are the ‘sell side’ of the securities industry, while 
advisers are the ‘buy side.’  The potential for conflict is demonstrated by FINRA’s explicit 
advocacy of extending the broker-dealer regulatory framework to advisers.  Conflicts may 
arise in that broker-dealers engage in arms-length transactions with investment advisers in 
various capacities, including as service providers, counterparties, market makers, and 
syndicators and underwriters.  An association representing private fund advisers has 
observed that these competing relationships ‘would present challenges to an SRO 
responsible for overseeing these types of firms fairly and equitably.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 326.  Id. at 498–99. 
 327.  Brief for CATO Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 9–11, Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 
637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011). Standard Investment Chartered involved an alleged 
misrepresentation in the 2006 proxy statement produced in connection with the 
consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. with the regulatory arm 
of the New York Stock Exchange, which resulted in the formation of FINRA.  637 F.3d at 
114. 
 328.  See 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 25–29 
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any sort of self-funding being enacted is vanishingly small. 
The recent controversy over the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (the “CFPB”) shows that self-funding remains deeply unpopular in 
Congress.
329
  The CFPB receives funds by requesting monies from the self-
funding Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
330
  While 
section 1017 of the Dodd-Frank Act caps the available funds at twelve 
percent of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Reserve has no discretion over transferring the requested funds.
331
  
The CFPB also collects filing fees under the Interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act and may keep whatever fines it levies.
332
  Republican 
lawmakers have decried the agency’s budgetary freedom, citing the lack of 
oversight and attendant potential for abuse.
333
  While possessing the power 
to “question” the agency, Congress will not be able to influence the 
direction and initiatives of the CFPB through the typical appropriations 
process.
334
 
 
(describing a 1992 bill introduced in the House of Representatives providing that investment 
advisers pay a user fee to fund SEC oversight and making several novel recommendations 
regarding self-funding). 
 329.  DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R425700, THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42572.pdf. 
 330.  Id. at 26. 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FY 2013 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 6–7 (2013), 
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/budget-justification.pdf; Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1017(a)(2), 
124 Stat. 1376, 1975–76 (2010); see Kevin Wack, Something to Watch: The CFPB’s Civil 
Penalty Fund, NAT’L MORTG. NEWS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com 
/dailybriefing/CFPB-Civil-money-penalty-fund-1031666-1.html. (discussing concerns that 
the CFPB will impose large fines in order to generate revenue and then award the money to 
consumer groups that are political allies). 
 333.  Wack, supra note 332. 
 334.  Ronald D. Orol, Republicans: CFPB’s Funding ‘Recipe for Disaster’, 
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-02-15/economy/ 
31062099_1_million-on-paper-clips-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-financial-crisis.  
Beyond the self-funding issue, the lack of checks-and-balances with respect to the CFPB has 
been controversial. The CFPB is led by a sole director, rather than a board of 
commissioners.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 
1011(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1924.  In addition, the director serves a five-year term and can be 
removed by the President only for cause.  Id. § 1011(b)(2).  Further, the only available 
appeal of a CFPB regulation is to the Financial Services Oversight Committee, which can 
only overturn a regulation that endangers the “safety and soundness of the United States 
banking system . . . .” Id. §§ 1023(a), 1011(a).  However, judicial review is available for 
parties subject to CFPB administrative enforcement actions by appealing to either the court 
of appeals “for the circuit in which the principal office of the covered person is located,” or 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, requesting that the court “modify, 
terminate, or set aside” the decision of the Bureau on the grounds provided for in the 
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As financial service firms are such an important fund raising source 
for Congress, it is particularly unlikely that their regulatory preferences will 
be ignored.
335
  The regulatory preferences of financial services firms are not 
always for less regulation.  In fact, the history of the ICA is a good example 
of an industry seeking more regulation in order to signal to the world that 
past misdeeds are behind it and that, in the future, it would operate in the 
interests of its customers.
336
  But, regardless of financial services firms’ 
preferences as to any particular regulatory regime, one can be sure that they 
do not want their regulators to be immune from political influence. 
This Article does not take a position on whether self-funding is good 
public policy.  Rather, it argues the more limited point that it will never 
occur. 
CONCLUSION 
As we think about investment adviser regulation, we should focus on 
the practices that we want to regulate rather than using disclosure as our 
primary tool.  We then should focus on the mechanisms by which these 
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practices should be regulated.  Obviously the two are interrelated.  Without 
an effective regulatory process, it does not matter what is regulated.  And, 
without the proper subject being regulated, it does not matter how well-
structured the regulatory process is.  But what is regulated may relieve 
some of the pressure on how it is regulated.  A ban on certain compensation 
practices for advisers to retail clients, as has been done in Australia and the 
U.K., is easier to police than a partial ban on conflicted practices combined 
with disclosure.  The perfect example of this is soft dollar commissions 
under section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Instead of just banning 
this practice, Congress has created a situation where the SEC has engaged 
in a process of drawing fine distinctions that can make no one, except a 
lawyer, happy. 
We should be skeptical about whether pushing the regulation of 
smaller investment advisers onto the States is an effective means of dealing 
with the resource problems of the SEC.  As this Article has discussed, 
nothing in the history of state regulation suggests that it has been a 
particularly effective substitute for SEC regulation.  And, going forward, 
there is nothing to suggest that the financially-challenged state 
governments of today will devote any additional resources to this issue. 
We also should be skeptical about whether any of the procedural fixes 
discussed in this Article will be adopted.  Certainly, significantly increased 
funding for the SEC, much less self-funding, is a politically dead issue.  
Although creating a private cause of action for advisees under the IAA 
might help bridge the SEC’s lack of resources, it too is probably a 
politically dead issue.  Nothing that Congress or the Supreme Court has 
done over the past twenty years has demonstrated any receptiveness to 
private causes of action to enforce the federal securities laws. 
The one procedural change that has a realistic chance of succeeding is 
the creation of an SRO for investment advisers.  While an SRO might have 
the resources to more closely regulate investment advisers, it will be 
hampered in its effectiveness if regulation continues to be focused on 
disclosure rather than substantive regulation of conflicts. 
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